Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-056
Wednesday
23 March 1994

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-056 *23 March 1994*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

ALBANIA

Ceka Interviewed on 'Political Violence' *[ALEANCA 17 Mar]* 1

BULGARIA

U.S. 'Pressure' on Bosnia Issues Cited *[KONTINENT 19-20 Mar]* 3
Ilinden OMO Leader Details Macedonian Claims *[TRUD 16 Mar]* 3
SDS Urged To Start Talks With Other Parties *[KONTINENT 16 Mar]* 4
Defense Leaders Order Organizational Reforms *[Sofia Radio]* 5

CZECH REPUBLIC

Situation Facing UNPROFOR in Bosnia Viewed *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 18 Mar]* 6
Confusion Over Number of UN Reinforcements *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 18 Mar]* 6
Baudys' Conduct in Bacteria Scandal Questioned *[CESKY DENIK 21 Mar]* 7
Klaus Likens Attitudes to UK Conservatives *[LIDOVE NOVINY 21 Mar]* 7
Trade Union Leader Addresses Prague Rally *[Prague Radio]* 9
Klaus: Government Not Involved *[Prague Radio]* 9

SLOVAKIA

New Head of Government Office Appointed *[Bratislava Radio]* 10
Ministry Official Views RFE Broadcast Problem *[PRAVDA 18 Mar]* 10
CTV Acquires REUTER as Partner *[REPUBLIKA 17 Mar]* 10
Comparison of Meciar Address to Parliament 11

HUNGARY

Jeszenszky Views 'South Slav' Situation *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 19 Mar]* 12
Resolution To Submit EU Accession Bid Adopted *[Budapest Radio]* 13
SZDSZ Nominee for Prime Minister on Election *[Budapest Radio]* 13
Republic Party Describes Economic Policy Program *[MAGYAR NEMZET 21 Mar]* 13
MSZMP Official on Tasks, Election Prospects *[PESTI HIRLAP 21 Mar]* 14
Slovak Defense Minister Views Regional Ties *[Budapest Radio]* 15

POLAND

Ukraine's Zlenko on Security Zone, EU Pact *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Mar]* 16
NSC Official Meets With Ukraine's Ambassador *[Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY 18 Mar]* 16
Public Opinion Poll on NATO Issues *[PAP]* 16
Pawlak Expected To Approve Rosati Nomination *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Mar]* 17
Siemiatkowski Rumored To Go to Defense Ministry *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 22 Mar]* 17
Minister on Walesa, Budget, Election Promises *[Warsaw TV]* 17
Public Support for Quick Privatization Wanes *[TRYBUNA SLASKA 14 Mar]* 18
Central Europe States' Investment Risk Compared *[SLOWO POLSKIE 16 Mar]* 19
OPZZ: Different Standards Used for Unions *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Mar]* 20

ROMANIA

Iliescu on Turkish Relations, Regional Issues *[Ankara TV]* 22
SRI Deputy Dismissed for Leaking Information *[ROMANIA LIBERA 19 Mar]* 22
Nastase Allegedly Blocking Coalition Plan *[ROMANIA LIBERA 19 Mar]* 23
Nastase Cited on Transylvania, UDMR Stances *[Bucharest Radio]* 23
Mayors Group Calls For 'Real Local Autonomy' *[Bucharest Radio]* 24

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

UN Confirms Serbs Removing Artillery *[AFP]* 25
Serbs Continue To Violate Sarajevo Cease-Fire *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
Renewed Serb Shelling in Bugojno *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
Serbs Use Chemical Agents on Bihac Front *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
Serbs Hold Up Aid Convoy Bound for Maglaj *[AFP]* 26
HVO Extremists Continue To Violate Cease-Fire *[Sarajevo Radio]* 26
Ganic: Success of Agreement Depends on Croats *[DANAS 15 Mar]* 26
Presidency Member: Herceg-Bosna 'Never Existed' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 27
Assembly To Adopt New Constitution *[Zagreb Radio]* 27
Bridge Opens to Pedestrians in Sarajevo *[AFP]* 28
Road Opens to Traffic *[TANJUG]* 28
Krajisnik: Negotiations on Airport Not Over Yet *[TANJUG]* 28
UNHCR Says Airport Opening Delayed *[TANJUG]* 29
Aid Leaves for Tuzla Unhindered *[TANJUG]* 29
Commentary: Aggressors Responsible for Peace *[Sarajevo Radio]* 29
Negotiations on Prisoner Exchange Begin *[Zagreb Radio]* 30
UN Official: Serbs Uncooperative *[Sarajevo Radio]* 31

CROATIA

Croats, RSK Serbs Begin Cease-Fire Talks *[AFP]* 32
Advisers Replace Defense Ministers *[TANJUG]* 32
RSK Leader 'Not Satisfied' *[TANJUG]* 32
Bjegovic: Nothing Will Be Signed *[Belgrade Radio]* 33
Negotiations To Continue *[Belgrade Radio]* 33
Participants 'Optimistic' *[Zagreb Radio]* 34
FRY Official Comments *[TANJUG]* 34
Tudjman News Conference on U.S. Visit, RSK *[Zagreb Radio]* 35

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Greek 'Sources' Report U.S. Military Preparations *[TANJUG]* 40
Soros Gives $4 Million for Embargo Losses *[MILS-NEWS 23 Mar]* 40

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Economic Cost of UN Sanctions Viewed *[TANJUG]* 41
Jovanovic 'Suspicious' About U.S. Objectives *[Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE 23 Mar]* 41
Commentary Notes Skepticism Over Military Budget *[BORBA 17 Mar]* 42

Serbia

UN Report on War Crimes Viewed *[TANJUG]* 42
Commentary on U.S.-German 'Rivalry' in NATO *[VOJSKA 10 Mar]* 43
Milosevic, Greek Communist Delegation Meet *[TANJUG]* 44
Party Official Expects Protests To Erupt *[Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS 19-20 Mar]* 44
Draskovic Compares Washington Accord to Yalta *[Belgrade Radio]* 45
Urges Cantons as Alternative *[TANJUG]* 46

Ceka Interviewed on 'Political Violence'

AU2003194094 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 17 Mar 94 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Democratic Alliance Chairman Neritan Ceka by Ernest Tushe; place and date not given: "Neritan Ceka Speaks Out"]

[Text] [Tushe] The last week has been fraught with a number of disturbing incidents in our country's politics. How would you assess the political situation on the basis of these events?

[Ceka] I consider the political situation to have been inflamed artificially. For you journalists, Albania is really an ideal country where you do not have to chase news, because the state drops in into your lap in the most incredible fashion. However, these incidents give rise to despair in Albanian readers wearied of both the past and their present lives, that might be summed up in the words: "This lot are the same as the old ones!"

I think that two factors have inflamed the situation. First, there is the factor of economic insecurity. Despite the euphoric figure of a 10 percent growth in production, the state exchequer is in the red and will remain so in 1994. This feeling of hunger is making the state nervous.

The second factor concerns the primitive level of political culture on which this state rests. In essence, it has much in common with communist collectivism, but differs from it in being based not on ideology but on nepotism, regional ties, and other primitive criteria. In both cases, the political result is hatred for free men and, in the constitutional sense, free citizens. As a result, those who wield power today, who found themselves at the head of the democratic movement accidentally, are always one step behind the prevailing mentality and are now in conflict with it.

[Tushe] Specifically, you also accuse the state of the assault on deputy Teodor Keko. Is it possible that his former friends could do such things?

[Ceka] I would not be surprised in the slightest if I were told that the criminal was sent by the ShIK [National Intelligence Service], ShIU [Military Intelligence Service] or ShIR [expansion unknown]. Representatives of these services were involved in the murder of Gjovalin Cekini in Shkoder and have not suffered any consequences. The fact that one week after the assault on Keko the president of the republic, the prime minister, the public order minister, and Mr. Arbnori have not said a single word in public, and have not sent a single official to learn about the incident or to enquire about deputy T. Keko's health, shows that his former friends are now on the side of the aggressor. I do not want to exaggerate by saying that the criminal was physically sent directly by them. However, morally, the brass knuckles in Keko's face were inspired by the aggressive speeches of those in power, the mistreatment of the opposition in parliament and politics, and the misinformation of radio and television.

As a human being, T. Keko stands much higher than those who were morally or physically behind his attacker. He is a first-rate writer and the sort of person who naturally finds it hard to make enemies. You have to nurse a powerful, primitive, and schizophrenic hatred of somebody to send against Keko, at a time when he has written such fine poems and stories, an unwashed, unshaven, long- haired individual to hit him with brass knuckles. These "sons of cunning fathers," as Lermontov once called those who order the murders of poets, should at least teach their hitmen how to wash, shave, and cut their hair and not to attack little Keko and his wife in such a hit-and-run fashion.

As far as the state is concerned, after the murderers of Shkoder, who fired with the president's name in their mouths, the state also has the hitman of Tirana on its side. This is a very serious matter, just like the Mateotti crime in Italy, and the state is obliged to speak out. Either it must publicly condemn the two crimes, or the president and the prime minister should admit that they are not in control of the situation. Otherwise, by their silence, they remain on the side of the crime.

I feel obliged here to point out the responsibility of the parliament and in particular that of the majority, on whose ballots political crime in Albania relies for its security. I cannot understand how a parliament can manage to remain silent when a criminal strikes one of its members in the middle of the street. A parliament that continually raises its voice over violations of Albanian rights in Kosova cannot discount as an Albanian the deputy Moikom Zeqo, who was maltreated in Montenegro, merely because he belongs to the Socialist Party [PS]. Before we are members of the Democratic Party, the PS, the Democratic Alliance [AD], or the Social Democratic Party, we are Albanian citizens and the parliament and the state have the same responsibilities to us all. But this is a parliament where the majority of deputies are struggling for their salaries and for two rooms and a kitchen in Tirana. In fact, all Albanian politics today is calculated on the basis of people wanting a job and an apartment in Tirana, or wanting to hide something in their past or present lives.

[Tushe] The public, before learning of any determination on the part of the state to arrest Gjovalin Cekini's murderers, was shocked by the suicide of his brother, Mehill Cekini.

[Ceka] Mehill Cekini did not kill himself. He was murdered by the state's silence. We are dealing with the tragedy of a citizen who felt himself isolated, surrounded by a state of cavemen. The Cekini family, knowing that the real murderers of their son were those who had sent the hitmen Bari, Kubazi, and Cela, did not ask for vengeance but justice. However, our state, whose filthiest agencies are now implicated in a common murder, is

now trying to play with the traditions and honesty of a highland family like the Cekinis, leaving them to face the criminals of Shkoder. Sixty years after Migjeni, these highlanders remain the victims of what this writer called "a beauty that kills," victims of the silence of a state that appears on television with luxurious offices, take-offs and landings of aircraft, and the same twisted smiles at official receptions. As long as Gjovalin Cekini's murderers are not arrested, they are protected by this syrupy "beauty" of the state.

[Tushe] After being forbidden to hold a meeting at Elbasan, the AD was also prevented from holding its planned meetings in Reps an Fan of Mirdita on 14 March. Do you see in this an escalation of the state's political violence?

[Ceko] This action by the police, of course at the orders of politicians, shows that the constitution is being violated in two ways. First, the most basic political rights are being restricted, such as the right to assembly. According to a regulation introduced by either nincompoops or people hostile to democracy, police permissions must be sought even for meetings in indoor halls. This is a violation of the Constitution, for which somebody will answer one day. The police officers who sign such orders must therefore look for a legal basis for such instructions. Second, directors of the Public Order Ministry are making open attempts to politicize the police. I sincerely advise them to be wary of such steps that not only compromise the state but their own futures.

Such measures that seem to be sporadic, such as the imprisonment of journalists, prohibitions on political activities, and assaults on political personalities, indicate a strategy of political violence directed against pluralism and democracy. There is no evidence that today's rulers have neither the economic resources nor the courage to establish a dictatorship. At the moment, the evidence is for a restricted democracy within the limits accepted by Europe. However, these rulers are unable to realize that Europe, and still less a people that has just emerged from dictatorship, cannot be taken in by a facade.

[Tushe] Do you think the Nano trial is part of this strategy?

[Ceka] Nano's guilt has still not been proved from the course of the trial so far, and he therefore still remains a political figure. This is therefore an act of political violence. Even though Nano is the chairman of a party that the AD opposes in the political spectrum and over many basic issues in our programs, I cannot accept the savagery with which the judiciary has treated him. All this leaves little hope that Albanian justice will aquire a European face. This is the justice of Brozi's two-rooms-and-a- kitchen or of some filthy dossier from the time of the dictatorship.

What worries me most of all is that the present economically and politically compromised regime, by identifying democracy with itself, is playing the way for a prematire resurgence of the left. Nano's trial, alongside the blockade of the PS's activities with the mobilization of thousands of policemen, is giving as a free gift to the Socialists the role of martyrs to democracy.

I am not sure whether the Socialists will be grateful to the present rulers when they take power.

U.S. 'Pressure' on Bosnia Issues Cited

AU2203121994 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19-20 Mar 94 p 7

[Yanora Grigorova commentary: "It Is Our Own Fault If We Are Making Fools of Ourselves"]

[Text] A few days ago a Greek daily reported that in his recent letter to Turkey's Demirel President Zhelev left a door slightly open regarding our noninterference in Bosnia. The Greek daily claimed that the pressure exerted by U.S. Ambassador Montgomery was the reason for Zhelev's halfhearted attitude.

The nervous reaction of the president's spokesman following the article was counterproductive as usual. Instead of denying the Greek daily's report, it practically confirmed it.

Ambassador Montgomery himself further complicated the situation by bringing a whole delegation of high-ranking U.S. officials to Bulgaria immediately after the denial. Even an acknowledged member of the National Security Council was among them. They admitted discussing the Balkan situation with Bulgarian political forces. People from the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] somewhat self-consciously admitted that they had supported the official Bulgarian policy on the conflict in Bosnia, the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] members did not say anything, and the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] representatives boasted of being the only ones who have a consistent approach on the Balkan issue.

As a matter of fact, none of them denied KONTINENT's information that the Americans had tested the approach of the political forces to a more specific interpretation of the nebulous "active neutrality" concept. The interpretation in question would also be likely to include such things as granting an air corridor to Turkey, placing our airports at the disposal of NATO aircraft patrolling Bosnia, and so forth.

The current situation can be described as ludicrous not so much because the United States is trying to exert pressure upon us for such activities. It is their right to do so. However, it is our right to refuse them. It is preposterous that we should not do so.

It has long since been known that our political forces cannot agree even on matters as elementary as two plus two. Nevertheless, whenever foreign emissaries are touring their party headquarters trying to persuade them to support one state to the detriment of another, their unfortunate Bulgarian constituents who still live in a country situated between these two states are entitled to hear a firmer stand than the little jokes about "we would be glad if Mr. Montgomery interfered in our domestic affairs."

Ilinden OMO Leader Details Macedonian Claims

AU2103151994 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 16 Mar 94 p 4

[Interview with Jordan Kostadinov, chairman of the Ilinden United Macedonian Organization, by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "Whoever Tries To Prove Macedonians Are Bulgarians Is Waging Propaganda for War in the Balkans"; first paragraph gives biographical details that appear in a box together with 1.5 x 1.5-inch photograph of Kostadinov]

[Text] Yordan Kostadinov was born in the village of Ilindentsi, in Sandanski district. He used to work as a teacher of mechanical engineering. At the constituent meeting of the Ilinden OMO [United Macedonian Organization], held on 14 March 1990 in the town of Sandanski, he was elected deputy chairman of the organization. Later, after the Ilinden OMO split, he was elected chairman of the extreme right wing.

[Veleva] Mr. Kostadinov, what are the aims of the Ilinden OMO?

[Kostadinov] During the four years since its formation, the Ilinden OMO has campaigned for the granting of national rights to the Macedonians. We are entitled to seek our rights, and not to be oppressed by those who want to ensure that the voice of a Macedonian declaring that he is a Macedonian is not heard. What we have been subjected to was a genocide and an assimilation. So far, over 150 of our people have been beaten by the authorities. Where is Bulgarian democracy going? Their propaganda describes us as riffraff, as crazy people, and yet we have winegrowers, tractor drivers, engineers, and teachers among our members. You media people incite the violence that the government and the authorities are practicing against us. What you are doing is covered by Bulgaria's Penal Code. The Ilinden OMO is a defender of national minorities, and whoever tries to prove that Macedonians are Bulgarians is waging propaganda for war in the Balkans!

[Veleva] However, according to the Constitution, Bulgaria is a one-nation state, so on what basis do you claim that a Macedonian national minority exists?

[Kostadinov] Look here, it is distinguished by its own culture, its own mentality, its own peculiarities, spirituality, and needs, in that it does not want to live oppressed by these Bulgarian policies and propaganda. This is what I mean.

[Veleva] How do Bulgarian policies oppress you?

[Kostadinov] Our population lives in a state of stress and neurotic fear. Old women still cover their heads with black scarves. What are we to say about this? How can I allow myself in my life to bear candles and flowers, and then you come along and beat me about the head. This is madness!

[Veleva] Is your home village within the borders of Macedonia or Bulgaria?

[Kostadinov] Within the borders of Macedonia.

[Veleva] In which language are you speaking at the moment, Mr. Kostadinov?

[Kostadinov] Language?... Look here now, we will not come to blows about the language. What language do the people of Radomir speak? I listened to some Ukrainians talking, and I understood them better than people from Radomir. We did not borrow the Macedonian language from our neighbors the Serbs or the Bulgarians, because we in fact gave our neighbors their written language. Macedonia was never occupied by the First or Second Bulgarian Kingdoms. Our language is the oldest in this region.

[Veleva] Who created the Macedonian language?

[Kostadinov] My God! You... I am sorry that I cannot speak to you as melodically as my grandmother and grandfather did. I at least have heard comments from old people who have been in Bulgaria and said that the people there did not understand their language. Are you trying to provoke me now? As long as this nation has existed, it has spoken its own language. Did you send textbooks to Preslav? Did you send us the alphabet? Did you open schools in the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries? Why do you pick on these matters?

[Veleva] Who is your favorite author?

[Kostadinov] Krustyo Misirkov, who speaks in the Macedonian language. Read his book; if you do not have it, we will send you a copy so that you can find out what he writes. His book was published in Sofia and then forgotten. You see now, bans and harassment have existed for more than 70 years. Our politics have remained the same.

[Veleva] How many members does your organization have?

[Kostadinov] In Pirin Macedonia [part of Bulgaria] there are 400,000-500,000. As regards how many members we have, we cannot tell you, because we do not want to. However, 70-80 percent of the population of Pirin Macedonia support us, but will not say so under the risk of fear. We simply want to avoid bloodshed.

[Veleva] In your view, does a Macedonian nation exist, and who created it?

[Kostadinov] So far four uprisings have shed rivers of blood for the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian state. You should ask our ancestors whether they were a nation of puppets of various foreign propaganda. The Macedonian nation was born at the same time as the Bulgarian one—at some time in the 12th or 13th centuries, or so I have read. You did not give us our letters, nor teachers, nor books and culture, and you borrowed your language from us. We now want to save this region from becoming a second Bosnia.

[Veleva] What were the nationalities of Cyril and Methodius, Kliment Okhridski, Gotse Delchev, and Yane Sandanski?

[Kostadinov] They were all Macedonians, no question of it. It is ridiculous to say that Gotse Delchev was a Bulgarian. Our grandfathers remember him. You must have read Peyo Yavorov's memoirs. You suggest Yane Sandanski was a Bulgarian? That is preposterous! What can we say about this?

[Veleva] From where does your organization derive its funds?

[Kostadinov] Let the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] say where they get their millions and their fine technical equipment from, let the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization [VMRO] say how it is financed, and then ask me this question again. We get our finance from companies. We are now entitled to ask the Bulgarian Government for money.

[Veleva] Why does your program include the words "withdrawal of the Bulgarian occupation forces from Macedonia"?

[Kostadinov] What do you mean, why? We know that in 1912 Macedonia was divided between three states. If Macedonia had been Bulgarian, then Bulgarian politicians would not have dealt with it the way they did; if it had been Greek, the Greeks would now be offering us a helping hand. The same goes for the Serbs. Macedonia represents spoils of war for Bulgaria, and the more territory we annex, the more of our country we will lose, and the sooner we will start a war to grab more territory.

[Veleva] Why do you constantly talk about possible bloodshed?

[Kostadinov] The propaganda is leading toward this. Relations are deteriorating. You should give up this propaganda and grant us our rights.

[TRUD editorial note] (The interview is reproduced without editorial intervention.)

SDS Urged To Start Talks With Other Parties

AU2103135994 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 16 Mar 94 p 8

[Genka Markova commentary: "Whose Should Initiative Be?]

[Text] Trying to conceal the fact that there is essentially a cabinet crisis is not only a moral issue, but also an affair of state. The unpleasant thing is that in such cases the curtain falls by itself and then the public notices the fact that the main political actors are nude, long before

they themselves realize it. They are helpless as children in the present situation. The leaders of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], for example, unanimously plead with Professor Berov to return to his post as soon as possible. Performing medical miracles they try to make the public believe in the political revival of the cabinet, which long ago exhausted the formula of its formation as a result of its insolvency. Naturally, the BSP will do this only until the moment it serves its interest, and in any case not before an agreement with the international finance institutions is signed, something which will serve as the main claim of the Socialists in the forthcoming elections.

As far as the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] is concerned, the present situation is another gift from heaven. The question is how will the SDS utilize it. After the 15 March meeting of its National Coordinating Council, the SDS called upon the president to begin consultations with the political forces.

What could one expect from such a proposal? First of all, after the recent attacks on the presidency the proposal is more than an admission of the president's role in political life. The idea to begin consultations with the political forces is the best way of finding a solution to the current crisis, which soon will develop from a cabinet into a parliamentary crisis. The increasing fluctuation of deputies from one faction to another will only prepare the ground for this development.

Our society is talking about new elections. Now someone should take the initiative, which will produce practical results. The five no-confidence proposals failed, but now the situation is rather different. Deputies of the New Alliance for Democracy categorically stated that they will not support the cabinet. Deputies from other factions, including the BSP, will most probably do the same. Now is the moment for the SDS to assume the initiative. Instead of waiting for the president to do the job of all other political factors in the country, the SDS now should propose a formula for beginning political consultations. Today this means a readiness to assume responsibility.

Defense Leaders Order Organizational Reforms

AU2203092394 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 21 Mar 94

[Text] A meeting of the Defense Ministry leadership reportedly took place on 18 March. It was chaired by Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov and attended by deputy ministers of defense, the chief of the General Staff and his deputies, and the commanders of the Armed Forces branches.

The elimination of duplicating units in the Ministry of Defense system was one of the items on the agenda discussed at the meeting.

In this connection the minister of defense ordered that his personal chancery and the general chancery of the Ministry of Defense should be closed down. A chancery of the Ministry of Defense was established instead. Colonel Engineer Konstantin Seizov was appointed chief of the new chancery. He is the former chief of the general chancery.

Situation Facing UNPROFOR in Bosnia Viewed

AU2203161394 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 Mar 94 p 6

[Commentary by Petr Pravda: "Difficult Conditions Await the Czech Soldiers in Bosnia"]

[Text] A situation that no Czech soldiers have endured since World War II awaits the mechanized company from the Czech UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) battalion, which should transfer in the next few days from Croatian Krajina to Bosnia, in the enclaves of Zepce and nearby Zavidovic.

Some 120 of our men, along with French and Jordanian UNPROFOR units, should monitor the situation in currently the most tense region of Bosnia, a region in which, to date, there have been no international observers or UN troops. The most ferocious battles of recent times in Bosnia have been waged some 25 kilometers away in Maglaj, which is completely surrounded by the Serbs. The Serbs have not permitted any humanitarian convoy to enter the town for several months.

Zepce is a Croatian-Muslim enclave some 60 kilometers north of Sarajevo, which, during the first stages of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, linked Central Bosnia, controlled by the Bosnian Sarajevan Government, to the regions of Maglaj and Tesanj in the northern part of the former Yugoslav republic.

During the course of the war, however, the Serbs succeeded in cutting a corridor through to Maglaj near the strategically located Zepce, and so the 100,000-strong mainly Muslim enclave was left completely isolated.

The situation is made even more complicated by the fact that, in Zepce and the surrounding area, everyone has been fighting, with intermissions, against everyone else, and expedient alliances have been formed. The Muslims, for example, claim that the Croatian armed forces allied themselves with the Serbs in an offensive against Maglaj.

The situation in Zepce itself and the immediate vicinity became calm only after the declaration of a cease-fire and the start of peace talks between the Croatians and the Bosnian Government a few weeks ago.

The Serbs, however, are very concerned about a Croatian-Muslim alliance and are now making an even greater push against nearby Maglaj. People are continuing to live there in catastrophic conditions and are virtually entirely dependent on the aid dropped to them from aircraft.

Just how difficult the conditions in Zepce and the surrounding area are is borne out by the information fog that prevails around the situation in this region, among other things.

UN officials have been unable for several days to provide a reliable report on recent developments in the strategic situation in Zepce because they have no precise information. The UNPROFOR spokesman in Zagreb has merely said that there has been no fighting in Zepce, but he has confirmed that the situation in the region is very complex. The Czech Defénse Ministry has been virtually unable to provide any information.

The Secretariat of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Zagreb, which is responsible for the humanitarian convoys to the besieged Bosnian enclaves, stated this week that the last aid convoy reached Zepce sometime in the middle of February. However, it was only one-third of what this enclave actually needs. UNHCR has no permanent staff in Zepce or Maglaj and no information about the current situation.

The Czech blue berets have, according to Defense Minister Baudys, a peaceful mission and should not be involved in the battles in the region. They should monitor the situation on the front line, which, however, is constantly changing, uphold the peace agreement between the warring sides, protect the civilian population, and help the humanitarian convoys to get through.

Nevertheless, it is extremely likely that our company, just like other international units, will be confronted by more than one dangerous situation and will not avoid coming into direct conflict with the warring sides.

Confusion Over Number of UN Reinforcements

AU2203155594 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by "(ptp)": "Confusion About the Reinforcements for Bosnia"]

[Text] New York/Prague—According to a senior UN official, the Czech Republic has promised to provide a United Nations Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] contingent of 500 men for Bosnia. However, in accordance with the government's decision, the Czech reinforcements should comprise only 120 troops. Domestic sources are denying the promise of greater reinforcements for Bosnia.

UN Deputy Secretary General Kofi Annan said, according to CTK, that 500 Czech troops should form part of the firmly promised reinforcements for Bosnia, which will number some 4,500 men. He said this following a meeting with representatives from the states that have troops in UNPROFOR forces.

"This information is inaccurate," said Miroslav Tuma, a member of the Czech Republic's permanent mission to the United Nations in New York, who took part in the talks with Annan. "We talked about supplementing our battalion in the sector south of Croatian Krajina and not in Bosnia," he said.

Karel Kovanda, ambassador to the United Nations, said that the Czech Republic is indeed dispatching only 120 troops—that is, a company—to Bosnia.

Pavel Kracmar, the head of the liaison officers attached to the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb, confirmed, nevertheless, that a report about 500 Czech reinforcements had been broadcast last week on CNN. However, Kracmar also thinks this is a mistake. "The Czech Republic has neither the potential nor the resources to do such a thing," he said.

According to reports from the Defense Ministry in Prague, no such reinforcement of the Czech UNPROFOR units is Bosnia is being taken into consideration. Such a high number could only be anticipated in a future objective by the UN command.

The government and parliament would have to make a decision on the possible deployment of another 500 troops in the former Yugoslavia.

Baudys' Conduct in Bacteria Scandal Questioned

AU2303122694 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 21 Mar 94 p 3

[Commentary by Lubor Kohout: "From Baudys's Realm of Fantasy"]

[Text] Fairy tales are meant for children; of course, some adults like them too—especially the old, traditional ones. The appeal of modern fairy tales is not so strong. Defense Minister Antonin Baudys, with the support of his subordinates, told us one like this last Friday [18 March]. The minister deemed it necessary to respond to the articles published in CESKY DENIK. They claimed that strains of bacteria and viruses intended for use as the basis for biological weapons are being stored (or concealed) in our military facilities.

If we summarize the statements made by the ministerial and Army top brass, this is what we get: Bacteriological and virological weapons were never developed in our secret military facilities, and not at all for the purposes of the Warsaw Pact. The institute in Techonin never took part in such activity; the scientists in its laboratories worked only on immunological research. According to Ales Macela, the current vice president of the Military Medical Academy and a leading research worker at the Techonin institute, there were no technical conditions in his institute for achieving genetic changes in individual strains. The two batches of strains of bacteria and viruses—the one in Techonin and the one that was kept in the building leased to the Klinlab (Clinical Laboratories) limited company in the Central Military Hospital in Stresovice—were simply harmless batches prepared in case the state was involved in a defense emergency. Moreover, 80 percent of them were common viruses, and a mere 20 percent were exotic viruses. Summa summarum: By storing the aforementioned strains, the Army in no way violated the international convention on prohibiting the use, development, and accumulation of biological weapons. The interdepartmental commission, whose establishment was initiated by Baudys, decided that it was no longer necessary to keep the strains, and, therefore, the viral banks were destroyed. Absolutely nothing happened. Irresponsible journalists from CESKY DENIK just want to injure our Army.

In considering whether it is CESKY DENIK or the gentlemen from the Defense Ministry and the Army who are telling fairy tales, it is enough to recall some of the facts confirmed by Minister Baudys himself and Chief of the General Staff Nekvasil: On 13 February, in connection with the personnel changes in the military health service department, Baudys finds out for the first time about the existence of batches of strains. An investigation follows, and, on 17 February, an interdepartmental commission is set up on Baudys's initiative. The swift destruction of the first batch in Stresovice begins in the next seven days. The defense minister personally orders the destruction. The chief of the General Staff also gives his personal guarantee that the destruction was carried out safely and that there was no risk. On 9 March, the ministerial and Army top brass receive the news that there is another batch of strains in Techonin in East Bohemia. Another swift destruction follows.

Other facts, not mentioned by Baudys, speak plainly. The whole affair has been investigated since the beginning by officers from Military Defense Intelligence (VOZ), who were present at the destruction along with the Military Police. VOZ is also taking care of the Techonin research documentation; of course, on Friday, Ales Macela claimed that it is still stored in Techonin. The Defense Ministry is handing over part of the case to the Security and Information Service. What on earth for? After all, only allegedly "common and no longer necessary" strains were destroyed!

There were several ways Minister Baudys could have acted before Friday. One of these was telling the truth. He could have said that genetically altered viruses and bacteria developed for use as biological weapons had been concealed without his knowledge. He could have admitted that they are still—in all probability—"stored" in other, so far unknown, places. He chose another course of action and thus associated himself with the people who had developed and concealed these materials. Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Jiri Payne declared yesterday that the whole incident has to be thoroughly investigated. It only remains for me to add that, if CESKY DENIK has not reported the truth, the authors of the articles are, according to the law, criminally liable. They could, for example, have committed the crime of spreading alarming reports. If the defense minister is familiar with the criminal law, he knows that he is required to submit a complaint. He will probably not do so, however, and he knows why. The ministerial fairy tales would not be enough to obtain a conviction in a law-governed state.

Klaus Likens Attitudes to UK Conservatives

AU2203152494 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 21 Mar 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus: "English Conservatism Is Close To Us"]

[Text] Springtime is already well advanced in London at the beginning of March. The grass is really green; not only narcissi but also pansies are flowering, and the first fruit trees are blossoming. Prague seems to be several weeks behind in this regard.

England is—by the way, as always—the real England. The taxis are the same as they were before World War I, and the policemen, too. Respectable gentlemen ride horses early in the morning in Hyde Park near your hotel. You go through precisely the same formalities with John Major in front of No. 10 Downing Street as previously. At dinner in a club with Conservative Party Chairman Norman Fowler, a fire is glowing in a real fireplace (just as in the Rothschild banking house). Quite simply, everything is the way it should be. Only Attali's bank exceeds your expectations because it is even more ostentatious (although in very refined taste) than you had imagined.

You again realize that England is and is not Europe. It is the only important European country that is an island.

It is proud of the fact that, in the period from 1066 to 1945, it never succumbed to an external onslaught, and it has never lost a war on its own territory. It proceeds from the premise that, in the 18th and 19th centuries, it spread throughout the world the ideas of Locke, Hume, and Adam Smith on individualism, private ownership, a law-governed state, and the market economy, and that these ideas were—and still are—formulated in English, and that, by their intensity, profundity, and ethos, they have left a fundamental mark on today's world. It does not want to abandon these ideas and its indisputable independence, and it is from this angle of vision that it looks at present-day Europe and its unification within the framework of the European Community (or Union).

It would be an exaggeration to say that destructive Euroskepticism prevails in England; the British are, on the contrary, constructive Eurorealists, and I have the feeling that we are in the same boat. They believe in European integration; they do not believe so much in European institutions. They do not want a federalist superstate, but this stance is based on something else, something far more profound than rigid and shortighted nationalism. They are, in essence, a unitary state and are watching closely, from this very angle of vision, developments in other European states with regard to today's integrative mechanisms. They are afraid that the Maastricht model will have, paradoxically for its supporters, very strong disintegrative consequences. Apart from the danger of Brussels' bureaucratic centralism, which they are really worried about, they see no less a danger in the gradual disintegration of certain existing European states (they see and hear Catalonia, Lombardy, and their own Scotland; they monitor the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium, and Bavaria, also) with only one possible outcome—disturbing the status quo and the dawn of a clouded European future. Instead of the European Twelve, several dozen small states may evolve, proceeding more from the concept of the 16th than the 20th century.

All of this is important for us, from both the point of view of our incorporation into Europe and that of our domestic territorial arrangement. When I discussed this with Mrs. Margaret Thatcher (this was a couple of hours after the Hungarian foreign minister had proposed in Trieste the cantonal model as a suitable method for the future Central European arrangement), she said "you cannot cantonize the world" and added that it is vital to clarify what the "natural unit of self-determination" is. For her (and for me, too), the nation state is such a unit—that is, not a smaller unit but a larger one. In this sense, the reasoning in the discussion on internal and external integration is in fact concordant. Supporters of regions are supporters of a unionist (if you like, federalist) Europe, while the critics of the excessive regionalization of the small Czech state are, at the same time, critics of the excessive federalization of Europe.

English conservatism is, in many ways, close to us, and I think that this feeling is mutual. The successes of the Czech Republic during the past four years are really appreciated very positively there, and the level of mutual understanding is unusually great.

When I deliver speeches to the public there (this time in the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute, of which I ceremonially became a member), I have to "sell" our successes, I have to strive for good publicity for our country. At home, we are often, for incomprehensible reasons, criticized for this by our ill-wishers, but I am convinced that, in essence, we are doing so correctly.

So as not to make an evaluation myself, I will end this recollection of England with a quote from the influential daily THE GUARDIAN (of 26 February 1994): "Let us imagine that the Czech prime minister takes over the presidency of the European Union and that, at the same time, he becomes involved in a conflict with French farmers, whom he accuses of being spoiled by the state.

"The koruna, fully convertible, is attracting extraordinary attention on world stock markets, and the British press, pointing to the further loss of British prestige, is complaining that the Czechs are catching up with us.

"Is this a futuristic fantasy? Or is it Europe at the end of this century?

"Unless something extremely unpleasant happens in the world, the Czechs have every right to expect that this scenario is very close to reality."

We should certainly accept with pleasure this vision of a British journalist, and I believe that each of us is doing, and will do, his utmost to ensure that it is fulfilled as soon as possible.

Trade Union Leader Addresses Prague Rally

LD2203164794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] According to journalists' estimates, following the call by the Czech-Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions Association, approximately 40,000 people gathered in the Old Town Square in Prague at midday today to tell the government and deputies that the situation of employees and pensioners is nearing the limits of tolerance. Chamber Chairman Vladimir Petrus addressed the rally.

[Begin Petrus recording] What should also be asked is: What is the reason for this state of affairs? The laws are imperfect, the linkage between the laws is poor, there is a perceptible lack of jurisdiction governing administrative and labor affairs. Other necessary laws that could prevent these phenomena and developments from taking place are clearly absent, too.

These are the problems that you, the government and the parliament, should focus on; this is the area where your efforts should be targeted. But do not look for enemies and extremists in the trade unions. [applause]

All of the extremes, foreign and domestic ones alike—Zhirinovskiy and his supporters, no matter where they may be—are alien to us. For this very reason, we consider it our civic duty to speak up and say that we have had enough, that things cannot go on like this, that people's dissatisfaction is looming over us, and that it is inadvisable to play around with this dissatisfaction. [applause] [end recording]

Klaus: Government Not Involved

LD2203141094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] A little while ago, Czech radio asked Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to comment on today's rally staged by the Czech-Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions Association.

[Begin Klaus recording] I am not at all willing to comment on this rally because the government has not contributed one iota to this rally. This is simply a 100-percent, or 101-percent, matter of the trade unions. This has nothing to do whatsoever with the government.

The talks between the government and the trade unions have been conducted in an absolutely correct way, I think. A number of comments trade unions had regarding the amendment of the Labor Code have been accepted. Thus, any consideration that the government failed to consult these matters with the trade unions is an absolute lie and a fallacy. It does not necessarily follow that the government should accept all of the trade unions' comments in their entirety, as some trade union leaders might wish. In my view, there is nothing in this matter that the government would have to feel responsible for. I am getting reports from all over the Republic speaking about false pressure campaigns when trade unionists invite people to take a free trip to Prague, where, as part of this trip, they would briefly attend some kind of rally. Telephone calls, faxes, and letters coming from people all over the Republic clearly reveal these actions on the part of the trade unions. Personally, I would be ashamed to be a trade union leader. [end recording]

New Head of Government Office Appointed

LD2203154594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Jan Filko, current commissioner of the Slovak Government for legislature and deputy chairman of the Legislative Council of the government, has become head of the government office.

According to Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac, the government office was taken out of the system of other central bodies of state administration today and will fulfill only organizational and technical tasks for the needs of the government.

Ministry Official Views RFE Broadcast Problem

AU2203123894 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Vladimir Zeman, director of the Communications Section at the Ministry of Transport, Communications, and Public Works, by Stefan Mesaros; place and date not given: "Moments of Weakness and Influential Waves; Wherein Lies the Problem of Radio Free Europe Broadcasts?"]

[Text] According to Engineer Vladimir Ondrovic, director [general] of Slovak Telecommunications [ST], the one-day break in Radio Free Europe [RFE] broadcasts in Slovakia on Wednesday [16 March] was caused by the staff of the Ministry of Transport, Communications, and Public Works. The "villain" who issued the order supposedly was Engineer Vladimir Zeman, director of the Communications Section at the Ministry of Transport, Communications, and Public Works. How did he pull this off? This is discussed by Eng. Zeman himself, who gave us an interview.

[Mesaros] Are you really the person responsible for Eng. Ondrovic's "moment of weakness," in which he signed the decree on the abolition of RFE broadcasts in Slovakia?

[Zeman] I do not know who has moments of weakness or when, but my opinion is that managers simply should not have them when they sign important documents. I also consider unfair Eng. Ondrovic's statement that I forced him to sign the document and, subsequently, a copy of it. I think that he signed the document quite voluntarily, of his own volition. As for the copy, why would I need the same document again?

[Mesaros] Nevertheless, it seems strange that RFE broadcasts were cut off at the time a new government was taking shape. Was this not an act of defiance by the ministry's outgoing top leadership?

[Zeman] Those who know the problems surrounding RFE broadcasts know they have been dragging on for quite some time. When someone tries to make the public believe that this issue has only a political background, he is not telling the truth. Some people may have the impression that politics, too, are involved. Personally, I am interested only in the technical and economic aspects of the matter. Apart from that, I ask myself why, if these are supposed to be broadcasts for Slovakia, almost 80 percent of them are in Czech. Are we a sovereign state or not? After all, the broadcasts for Poles are not in Russian but in Polish! I stress, however, that these circumstances did not determine the step that was taken.

[Mesaros] At the aforementioned news conference, Eng. Ondrovic claimed that the RFE license, which entitles it to broadcast in Slovakia, is in perfect order. If that is the case, why were the broadcasts interrupted?

[Zeman] Apparently, he is not adequately informed. Had he been adequately informed, he would have known that the broadcasting license for RFE was issued by the former Federal Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting. Besides the fact that we have never renewed it, the issued license has a number of formal shortcomings that make it virtually invalid. Far more problems exist in the technical and economic spheres. In January 1994, we proposed a solution to these problems with the draft of a new contract. Had the RFE management approached this matter more flexibly, the new contract, which is advantageous for them as well as for us, could have been signed a long time ago. Whereas at present they pay us $680,000 annually for the transmission of the signal, under the new contract they would pay $1.5 million, but for a signal of much better quality that would cover a wider area. At the talks, they were also asked to broadcast for ethnic minorities in the Slovak Republic, as well.

[Mesaros] Do your words imply that the new management of the ministry, too, should reassess the terms under which RFE broadcasts?

[Zeman] I subscribe to that view.

[Mesaros] As we have learned, Eng. Ondrovic, whom you supposedly recalled [from the post of ST director general], has been reinstated by the new minister. Are you still in your post?

[Zeman] First of all, I would like to say that I did not have the authority to appoint or recall anyone to or from his post. However, the fact that the new minister had to reappoint Eng. Ondrovic bears out the fact that he had been recalled in a legally valid way. Hence, when posing at his news conference on Wednesday as ST director general, he was not right. As for me, for the time being I am still in my previous post. In an interview yesterday, the new minister said that he would be assessing people according to their work performance. I had a good impression from his words.

CTV Acquires REUTER as Partner

AU2103151194 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 17 Mar 94 p 4

[TA SR report: "REUTER Partner in CTV"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Slovak CTV television company, which is seeking a license to broadcast in the Slovak Republic, has acquired another foreign partner. It is REUTER, the world-famous news agency. Besides acquiring a minority stake of a maximum of 15 percent, REUTER is also interested in participating in news production. The first foreign partner in CTV was the German Commerzbank, which remains its exclusive financial representative. The Slovak company retains a majority stake of 51 percent.

Comparison of Meciar Address to Parliament

AU1803173494

Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 12 March publishes a special four-page "supplement" containing 14,000-word excerpts from the speech delivered by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar at the 11 March meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic prior to the passage of the vote of no-confidence in his government. The excerpts are published under the headline "A Society That Destabilizes Its Structures Is Defeated in Advance." Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 14 March on page 4 carries 3,000-word "passages from Vladimir Meciar's speech that, for reasons of space and, in particular, time, did not get into the special supplement published on Saturday [12 March]."

Comparison of the REPUBLIKA excerpts with the Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network Slovak version published in the 14 March East Europe DAILY REPORT, pages 15-23, makes it possible to provide the following clarifications, fills, and corrections:

Page 15, column two, paragraph five, second sentence reads: ...the statement that 90 percent of the.... (changing figure)

Page 16, column one, paragraph seven, only sentence to paragraph eight, first sentence reads: ...in Europe.

Today, you have 80 votes, you can formally express no-confidence in the government. This is the reality. (changing figure, rephrasing)

Page 17, column one, first full paragraph, sentence one to sentence two reads: ...we would receive $500 million. It happened... (changing figure)

Same page, column two, paragraph three, first sentence reads: ...minorities, the president never asked the government... (inserting word "never")

Page 18, column two, paragraph five, last sentence to paragraph six, first sentence reads: ...had it investigated. It all came to nothing. I am therefore glad that I am, and was, able to work with these people.

Equally, the president... (supplying indistinct words)

Page 19, column two, paragraph two, last sentence reads: ...the fight and you know that we... (changing "we" to "you")

Page 20, column one, paragraph three, last sentence reads: ...score with your conscience and with those... (changing "leadership" to "conscience")

Page 23, column one, paragraph two, sentence five reads: ...and subsequent solutions. But the worst solutions are radical ones. Thank you. (rewording)

Jeszenszky Views 'South Slav' Situation

AU2203211694 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Mar 94 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Janos Kobanyai in Sarajevo on 17 March: "We Cannot Take on the Role of Mediators"]

[Text] *Geza Jeszenszky's brief south Slav [Yugoslav] visit on 16 and 17 March could also be seen as an airplane show: He changed airplanes four times and tried out three different types. On the way from Zagreb to Sarajevo, the foreign minister and his entourage, together with the whole military region's commander in chief and his many associates, were transported by a fast passenger carrier. On the way back, we were in the hold of a cargo plane together with many containers, and French and British UN soldiers. Here, we had the opportunity to interview Jeszenszky.*

[Kobanyai] Having visited Sarajevo, you have now been to all three warring south Slav capitals. Do you now have a clear picture?

[Jeszenszky] Since the outbreak of the south Slav war, the intention of Hungarian foreign politics has been clear and unaltered: To keep the conflict away from our country and to preserve our good-neighborly relations with the old and new states. This is not easy, although, at the negotiating tables, the hatred that flared up in such a barbaric way between the nations cannot be perceived, in fact, all sides keep expressing their willingness for compromise. The situation is made more complicated by the fact that, in addition to being neighbors, a significant Hungarian minority is also living in the countries in question and we have to represent their interests and alleviate their serious problems caused by the war.

An ethnically based explosion makes people suspicious of all national minority organizations or demands. For example, after tough negotiations with the Croatian side, we have not even been able to achieve that they define such administrative boundaries in the areas in Baranja that still belongs to them through which the Hungarian minority can have a say in local politics. The general cultural agreement that has now been signed will provide a chance for the attitude that is also the basis of political views to change. Rather than Jelacic [Croatian general, led army against Hungary in 1848], the Zrinyi brothers [16th-17th century Croatian and Hungary family] should be symbols of our common past.

Our intentions to keep ourselves out of conflicts and to prevent further fragmentation have gained respect for our country. I and Austrian Foreign Minister Mock are the ones who have closely followed the conflict from its beginning, and we both have tried to channel the events toward peaceful solutions. Without much success, as can be seen. However, we do not have the means for it, either.

However logical it may seem because of the neighborhood, Central European experiences, and the familiarity with sensitivities, the role of mediator cannot be accepted because we do not have any forces of pressure or counter-forces behind us that could be used for achieving compromises. The fact that the Bosnian and Croatian sides are requesting peacekeeping forces from us demonstrates the respect we have in the region. At the moment, this is contrary to our doctrine, namely we cannot participate in the armed conflicts of neighboring countries, not even as peacemaking forces.

However, a number of times, I have offered Budapest for the peace negotiations that keep changing site. This site could offer a better and more authentic atmosphere due to its geographical and intellectual properties. After my visit to Sarajevo, I tend to think that these negotiations should be conducted in the Bosnian capital. This barren scenery could awaken the negotiating sides to the fact that the suffering of the innocent population cannot be increased anymore and it would compel them to find a peaceful solution, whatever it takes.

Hungary is, by all means, interested in peace. The tensions that would be relieved by peace could also fill us with progressive impulses—I am thinking of the situation of the Hungarian minorities living outside our borders. It would also have more tangible positive effects, namely economic ones.

I emphasized, at my talks in both Belgrade and Sarajevo, that, due to our geographic situation, we would like to play a decisive role in restoration. This includes reconstruction and longer term work. We would like to get access to new, or rather, old markets in the south Slav areas. It can also be expected that the new states formed from the former Yugoslavia will not trade with each other for a while for emotional reasons. With the major restructuring in Eastern and Central Europe, we are also having market problems, therefore, a mutual interest exists here.

However, how could we talk about concrete facts before a peaceful settlement is in place, when we have not even been able to achieve that we could directly present the much suffered Hungarians in Sarajevo with a few crates of aid?

[Kobanyai] What is the "message" of the south Slav conflict, the Sarajevo syndrome, for Europe?

[Jeszenszky] At the beginning of the century, people in this region moved around and communicated with each other freely. They did not hate each other. This was the work of a handful of intelligentsia whose effect increased in certain conflict situations. The artificial states created by the peace treaties following World War I did not prove viable. The effects of the tragedy that was sown at that time can still be felt. The "victorious" countries that dictated the peace have also failed in the long run. They have also become dependent. All this is proved by the south Slav conflict.

It is not natural to force people with different cultures and traditions to live together. At the same time, small, ethnically homogeneous countries are also unviable both from a security and an economic point of view. As early as in the middle ages, sections of cities, cities, and city alliances of different ethnic groups coexisted. They fulfilled supplementary functions and organically created the regulatory systems of their coexistence.

However, freely chosen integration cannot work without an external force coming from above. The European Community has to fulfill the former role of Vienna. The force that partially failed in Sarajevo—and this is one of the reasons that everything that is happening there is pointing beyond itself. Up to now, it has only made rather tame steps to curb the bloodshed. At the same time, it also has to be seen that events would have taken an even more tragic turn without it.

Therefore, now, the European thought, the European Community as an integrating and conflict-solving force is also being tested.

In the European integration, the Scandinavian and the Benelux countries are also maintaining their historically intimate relations and their coordinating and conflict preventing mechanisms. I see the Central European countries—which are linked together with thousands of historical cords, including the injuries suffered from each other—catching up with the European Union in units like these. Austria, Slovenia, and Hungary are on this road, and the Croatians also wish to join this model, this is one of the reasons it is important for them to get out of the Balkans war, even through compromises. I very much hope that the idea of the Visegrad group will not be lost, either, the positive changes in Slovakia give hope for this.

I see Eastern Central Europe's—including Hungary's—future in this integration of rapprochement that preserves the individual characteristics. I believe in this because it is not possible to do what I am doing without some kind of image of the future.

Resolution To Submit EU Accession Bid Adopted

LD2203163294 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] The National Assembly has adopted the government proposal for Hungary to submit its application for accession to the European Union. The parliament adopted the draft resolution on submitting the accession application with 233 votes in favor, zero votes against, and three abstentions.

It is possible that Hungary will submit its application to join the European Union as early as next Thursday, and Poland will probably do this at the same time, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry's state secretary said. Janos Martonyi was speaking to the MTI correspondent in Warsaw. He said that the main objective of his visit to Poland was to coordinate policy on European integration.

The state secretary observed that like the Hungarians, Polish foreign policy regards cooperation between the Visegrad countries to be important.

SZDSZ Nominee for Prime Minister on Election

LD1903142994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 19 Mar 94

[Excerpts] According to Gabor Kuncze, the Alliance of Free Democrats' [SZDSZ] nominee for the post of prime minister, the government is pursuing propaganda that highlights its successes in the run-up to the elections. Therefore, Kuncze criticized the government. He said that to provide a complete picture one also had to talk about negative phenomena. Zsuzsa Ladanyi reports on the forum for the inhabitants of Kalocsa [central Hungary].

[Ladanyi] People are filled with fears and this is frightening for me. [passage omitted] Kuncze added that many people did not hand over their recommendation slips [for candidates in the 8 May elections] because they were afraid that their data could be registered somewhere and be misused. I think this fear is unfounded and the institutions of democracy are stable in Hungary, Kuncze said. [passage omitted]

We heard at the forum in Kalocsa that Kuncze had found that people were paying attention more and more to what the various parties were saying. Thus, it is important for them to be aware of the election possibilities. Therefore, it is particularly sad that discussion programs, which have counterbalanced government propaganda and in which opinions have been set out against one another, have been taken off the television. What happened at state radio [dismissals] will also lead to this. The next government should guarantee the impartiality of television and radio and supervise impartiality, Kuncze said.

He said that a high turnout at the elections was extremely important so that the coalition had sufficient backing and that extremes do not get into parliament, said the SZDSZ's nominee for prime minister at the forum for inhabitants of Kalocsa.

Republic Party Describes Economic Policy Program

AU2103180994 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 21 Mar 94 p 11

[Correspondent's report: "The Anti-Inflationary Policy of the Republic Party—A Social-Economic Fund Is Sufficient"]

[Text] The consolidation of banks, begun by the current government, would be followed by an acceptable pace of privatization mainly from 1995. Accordingly, the

Republic Party urges the influx of foreign capital, instead of a redistribution of stocks. The Republic Party recently described its monetary and fiscal policy and its effect on inflation. According to Republic Party Deputy Chairman Laszlo Fodor, it is still possible to cope with a budget deficit of 5 percent of the GDP. It is essential that Hungary fulfills its debt-repayment obligations. If a new government takes power after the elections, the Republic Party will play a role in this government and will assert its view that Hungary still needs a basically strict monetary and fiscal policy for quite a while.

The Republic Party urges the development of a banking environment more interested in financing the economic players than in investing in state bonds. The program of the Republic Party includes an interest policy and system that lead to interest rates encouraging savings. Laszlo Fodor mentioned the fact that the party thinks that the program of the current government in financing the exports and imports is worth continuing, and it is necessary to set up a relevant bank for this, as well as a stock company to provide export guarantees. It is already certain that, if they get into the government, the Republic Party will submit a supplementary budget by the second half of this year. They will immediately eliminate the system of separated state funds; instead, they will set up a single such institution. This social-economic fund would replace the current 100 or more funds and it would finance projects on the basis of a uniform, strict and throughly controlled system of criteria. According to Laszlo Fodor, everything that is happening with these funds in Parliament today is only helping a wasteful economy, because the current law allows these funds to give loans to each other in exchange for interest.

The Republic Party thinks that income from privatization can be the source of reducing the state debts and, therefore, the party wants to allocate more funds for this, and would recirculate the remaining funds into the economy. The economic program of the Republic Party finds its unrealistic to achieve a one-digit inflation in a short time, but it is certain that inflation can be maintained much below 20 percent. The party does not intend to bring elements that increase the inflationary pressure in the economy. In case it gets into power, the Republic Party will guarantee the indexation of pensions, minimum wages, and public employees' salaries every three months, in order to adjust them to the rate of inflation. Thus, the party could achieve an increase in purchasing power. The party wants to achieve a similar agreement between the employees and the employers.

MSZMP Official on Tasks, Election Prospects

AU2103181194 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 21 Mar 94 p 5

[Interview with Laszlo Fazekas, secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, by Daniel Bodnar; place and date not given: "Convinced Communists"]

[Excerpts] *The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [MSZMP] led by Gyula Thurmer changed its name to Labor Party in March 1993. However, a small group of MSZMP members thought that Thurmer's Labor Party wanted to become a bourgeois workers party, and this was unacceptable for them. Therefore, they did not join the new party and continued to engage in politics by maintaining the party's old name. A 43-years-old entrepreneur, Laszlo Fazekas, became the secretary of the MSZMP, a party with a small number of members. He has been an MSZMP member since 1975. He proudly claims that he joined the MSZMP out of conviction, and not by force, at the time. [passage omitted]*

[Bodnar] How would you characterize the MSZMP?

[Fazekas] We are a party based on Marxist-Leninist ideas and our collective decisionmaking mechanism is based on collectivism. The present MSZMP can be defined as a democratic party, building from below. With our efforts and our current modest means, we would like to serve the future.

[Bodnar] How do you relate to the bourgeois democracy?

[Fazekas] We accept its existence, but it is our firm goal to create a real democracy; our main goal is to create a real people's power. Of course, we want to achieve our goals within a constitutional framework, by means of elections. We attribute a considerable role to the activity of political information; by this, we would like to make sure that the masses finally understand our real interests. We accept the multiparty system and we believe that no party can function properly without a really critical opposition. A multiparty system can be useful, but it must be filled with real content.

[Bodnar] What kind of relations do you have with the various leftist organizations? I mean here primarily the Labor Party, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], and the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ].

[Fazekas] Since March 1993, we have been doing our utmost on our part to work out a cooperation and action program based on the principle of equality. Unfortunately, our former mother-party, the present Labor Party, does not show proper flexibility toward our approach. Our approach to other leftist organization is not really rapid either because of the tremendous stakes of the parliamentary elections. Although we have ideas regarding the future on paper, everything is too much tied down in the current situation for a leftist cooperation to emerge on an increasingly large platform. However, we are convinced, and we also informed our future partners about this, that only a real collaboration of the leftist forces can lead to a real change in the political life. [passage omitted]

I think that the left can be definitely more successful in four years time, because the domestic social processes and the European and global economic processes will

drift the people toward the left, whether some political circles like it or not. [passage omitted]

[Bodnar] What results do you count on in the elections?

[Fazekas] It would be a real achievement for us if we could express our opinion about the current state of affairs and about the future in as many places as possible, because the current practice of turning to the past, something that characterizes certain political circles, is absolutely inexpedient and it draws the attention away from the really important problems. I think it will definitely be a political gain for us if we can voice our opinions in more than half of the election districts. We will not despair even if the party remains without any parliamentary deputy, because time is working for us anyway. [passage omitted]

Slovak Defense Minister Views Regional Ties

LD2103200594 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 21 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Since the establishment of Slovakia's new government, this is the first visit by a Slovak minister abroad to Budapest. Slovak Defense Minister Pavol Kanis has confirmed that military cooperation continues under the agreement signed by Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur with the Slovak defense minister last October 1993. Laszlo Gardai reports on the details.

[Begin recording] [Gardai] [passage omitted] I asked the Slovak defense minister what are the chances of a political turn in the relations of the two countries in his view, and what kind of steps would be necessary to be taken by the two sides.

[Kanis in Slovak with superimposed Hungarian translation] A more civilized political conduct is required than the one we had so far. It applies to both Slovak and foreign politicians. It would be important that the small countries established on the territories of former federations give up nationalism. Nationalism implies isolation in this region. Slovakia will be open in the future, and we will devote special attention to the cooperation between the member states of the Visegrad Four, the Slovak defense minister said. [end recording]

Ukraine's Zlenko on Security Zone, EU Pact

WS2303113894 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Mar 94 p 23

[Interview with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko by Piotr Koscinski in Warsaw; date not given: "A Better Atmosphere Around Ukraine"]

[Text] [Koscinski] Ukraine has decided to hand over all of its rockets and nuclear warheads to Russia, where, in line with the provisions of START I, they are supposed to be destroyed. Do you think the security guarantees received from the United States and Russia in return are sufficient for Ukraine?

[Zlenko] The trilateral Ukrainian-U.S.-Russian declaration, signed in Moscow on 14 January, defines quite unequivocally the principles on which our national security is to be based. I am thinking of such factors as territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, and recognition of the sovereignty and independence of our country, as well as the assurance that no economic pressure will be exerted on us. I believe that this can be fully satisfactory for us. We are currently holding concrete talks with many states to prepare a multilateral document that will confirm these principles.

[Koscinski] It is generally believed that the West (especially the United States), in its relations with the states of Central and East Europe, is concerned only with Russia and that only Russia is of any real importance. What is your evaluation of the West's attitude toward Ukraine?

[Zlenko] I believe that the contacts between the Ukrainian president and his U.S., the results of the recent visit by President Leonid Kravchuk to Washington, and the signature of the aforementioned trilateral agreement favorably affect Western states, which are changing their attitude toward Ukraine. At any rate, our country is no longer perceived as a nuclear monster that may threaten others. For example, an agreement on partnership with the European Union [EU] is expected to be signed (today—editor's note); this proves that the atmosphere around Ukraine is favorable. We are the first country in CIS to sign such an agreement. A positive decision by the EU represents a positive decision by its 12 member states. There are also other examples that show that the political atmosphere is changing to the advantage of Ukraine.

[Koscinski] Ukraine proposes establishing a regional security zone in Central and East Europe. In the meantime, Belarus, which is expected to sign an agreement on monetary union with Russia, will enter the sphere of even greater political influence from Moscow. How, then, do you envision the future of the proposed zone?

[Zlenko] Belarus will decide for itself whether or not to join that zone. I can speak only about Ukraine. We are very interested in creating a zone of stability and security in Central and East Europe. Fundamental for us are the proposals presented by President Kravchuk. We believe that Poland and Ukraine, large countries located in the same region, should very soon discuss the principles of both sides' security. We should do this bearing in mind the Pact on Stability, proposed by the EU, to lead to the establishment of an all-European security system.

NSC Official Meets With Ukraine's Ambassador

AU2203130894 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 18 Mar 94 p 4

[Statement by the Press Center of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "A Briefing by the Ambassador"]

[Text] *Ukraine's Ambassador in Poland H. Udovenko met with J. Milewski, the leader of the National Security Council [NSC], subordinated to the Polish president. Milewski is also deputy minister of defense and cochairman of the Ukrainian and Polish Presidents' Consultative Committee. The Polish leader showed interest in the ambassador's briefing on the results of President L. Kravchuk's visit to the United States. He also stressed that President L. Walesa had repeatedly stated that Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity are of great significance for the entire European continent.*

The head of the National Security Council expressed confidence that the forthcoming official visit by Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zlenko will give a further impetus to Ukrainian-Polish relations in all spheres.

It is planned to discuss, during the visit, an extensive range of issues of bilateral cooperation within the framework of the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program.

Public Opinion Poll on NATO Issues

LD2203195194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1544 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Warsaw, 22 Mar—Forty-one percent of those polled by the Public Opinion Research Centre [OBOP] agreed with the view that the West betrayed Poland and the other Central European countries by refusing them immediate acceptance into NATO. At the same time, 79 percent of those canvassed by OBOP think that Poland should try to get into NATO. Seven percent were against this idea, and 14 percent had no opinion on the matter.

The poll was carried out from 4 to 6 February of this year, on a 1,015-person random nationwide sample of Poles over age 15.

Fourteen percent of those polled firmly agreed with the view on "betrayal," and 27 percent "were inclined to agree." Nine percent of those polled firmly disagreed with this formula, and 27 percent "were inclined to disagree." Twenty-three percent of those polled had no opinion on the matter.

In the opinion of 52 percent of those polled by OBOP, Poland is a sovereign country; according to a further 36 percent, it is not, and 12 percent of those polled had no

opinion on the matter. According to OBOP, these results do not differ from a similar poll carried out in March of last year.

Forty-two percent of those polled think that entry into NATO will happen in several years' time, and 23 percent in a dozen or so years. In the opinion of 6 percent of respondents, entry into NATO will happen inside a year or two; the same percentage stated that it would never happen. The youngest respondents were the most positive on the chances of rapid acceptance into NATO.

Sixty-eight percent of respondents had heard of the "Partnership for Peace" program, and 31 percent of them expressed interest in the idea. Two-thirds of this group think that the partnership proposal will increase Poland's security, and one-quarter are of the opposite opinion.

Pawlak Expected To Approve Rosati Nomination

WS2303113794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by E.K.: "Prime Minister Gave Assurances to Coalition; Dariusz Rosati Finally Accepted"]

[Text] Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak is today expected to forward to the Belweder a motion requesting the appointment of Dariusz Rosati to the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister.

"We have received such an assurance from the coalition," said Aleksander Kwasniewski, following the Tuesday [22 March] session of the coalition's leadership.

As he was leaving the headquarters of the Polish Peasant Party, Prime Minister Pawlak merely stated that a press conference would be held on Wednesday. It can be expected, therefore, that he will officially announce the decision he reached yesterday.

Apart from the prime minister and the leader of the Democratic Left Alliance, also participating in the coalition meeting were Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, Senate Speaker Adam Struzik, Deputy Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Michal Strak, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, and Jerzy Szmajdzinski, general secretary of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic.

One of the issues discussed was, among other topics, the report from the National Council of Radio and Television.

The coalition has not yet agreed on a joint position on this issue because not all of the deputies have had time to familiarize themselves with the council's report.

"Evaluation of the report calls for a serious discussion, which will be held at the end of April or the beginning of May," said Kwasniewski.

Siemiatkowski Rumored To Go to Defense Ministry

WS2303090194 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Z.L.: "Siemiatkowski to Defense Ministry; Whether Kolodziejczyk Has Changed His View"]

[Text] *Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, a political scientist, a member of the Chief Council of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, a press spokesman for the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], a Sejm deputy, a member of the National Judiciary Council, and a scholar at Warsaw University, will most probably be appointed deputy defense minister.*

In accordance with the required procedures, Siemiatkowski's candidacy should be presented to the prime minister by the chief of the Defense Ministry [MON] Piotr Kolodziejczyk. Negotiations concerning a "reflection of the coalition arrangement in MON's civilian section" lasted several months, with some long breaks. All signs are that Minister Kolodziejczyk, who seemed to be unshaken in his conviction in the beginning and who was accused by the chairman of the Sejm National Defense Commission, Jerzy Szmajdzinski (SLD), of "speaking not with his own voice but with the Belweder's" regarding the coalition minister, changed his mind after all. It seems that Kolodziejczyk, who, until recently, categorically opposed "attempts aimed at placing a political commissioner in the ministry," has come to appreciate (under the coalition's pressure because he recently met Aleksander Kwasniewski, among others) the need to establish the post of under secretary of state, who would relieve him of the need to contact the parliament and would also be in charge of the military justice system. Last week, Siemiatkowski also met the MON chief.

We found out from circles close to the General Staff, which is the main commanding organ of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic, that the Army's leadership cadre tends to take a distanced position on the skills of the new deputy defense minister, who so far has had little to do with the Army, except for his membership in the Sejm National Defense Commission. During a recent interview for our newspaper, General Tadeusz Wilecki, who is the chief of the General Staff, emphasized his disapproval of "attempts to adapt MON structures to specific people."

Minister on Walesa, Budget, Election Promises

WS2203131894 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1430 GMT 20 Mar 94

[Interview with Leszek Miller, labor and social policy minister, by unidentified reporters in Warsaw on the "Hundred Questions To..." program—live]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] Mr. Minister, you mentioned money. How much money do you specifically need, and how would you spend it?

[Miller] You know, of course I need more of it than I have right now, but I am happy that, at least when it comes to some items, I have more money than I used to. For instance, when it comes to active forms of combating unemployment, my ministry has almost 6 trillions zlotys [Z] at its disposal right now, whereas we used to have just Z3.5 trillion. That is an increase of over 60 percent. So there are reasons for me to be happy with that. But, when it comes to social assistance, the situation is not as good there. The Z16 trillion that constitute the amount at the disposal of local governors will meet this year's needs at approximately the same level as last year. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] There is ever more talk of unfulfilled election promises that were made by the now governing coalition, even though only six months have gone by. When asked whether he will sign the budget, President Walesa said that, if he does decide to sign it, it will be with the reservation that society was treated with disregard once again, in the sense that something was promised to society, and it is being given something completely different right now. Are you to blame for that?

[Miller] Because you want to talk about election promises, let me remind you that there were all kinds of promises made then. For instance, our opponents from the election campaign used to say that, if the left wing wins, political isolation of Poland will follow. That did not happen. They also said there would be economic isolation, as well, that the West would turn its back on us. That did not happen, either. These opponents also said it is time to start buying vinegar in grocery stores—and, as far as I can recall, Mr. Borusewicz said he has already done that—because there will be nothing left in the stores. They also said one would have to introduce food-rationing coupons and so forth. So let us also confront these promises that were made back then. Of course, I am happy that these particular promises have nothing to do with the current reality. But what I would have to do is ask you [addressing the reporter] which specific promise you mean. If, for instance, you mean that we said that the level of the lowest retirement pensions and other kinds of pensions must be raised, the fact is that we did even more than what we promised because we said we would implement a 3-percentage-point raise effective 1 January, but, when it comes to retirement pensions, the actual raise is 4 percent. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Mr. Minister, I am not sure why, but there have been no questions so far on the strike situation. Do you plan on using force in the event of a general strike or if electricity is cut off from the building of the Council of Ministers' Office [URM]? There are such doubts in trade union circles.

[Miller] I cannot assume that a situation could take place where the URM building should be deprived of electricity because there are other ways of supplying it there.

[Reporter] But when it comes to a general strike?

[Miller] Of course, a general strike is a big danger, and, because you mentioned it, the current conflict with Solidarity is taking place kind of on two levels: The first level is about real social problems. After all, no sane person could say that there are no families for whom life is extremely difficult; in fact, the situation of many Polish families is indeed tragic. But the other level of the dispute is about an argument concerning the ways and methods of solving the conflicts. We cannot treat Solidarity any differently from all of the other trade unions. The previous government treated Solidarity in a privileged way, and then it was brought down by that very Solidarity. We cannot make the same mistake. We will be trying to establish such areas of negotiation that are based on equal treatment of all trade union centers. So, if Solidarity wants to force the government to treat it differently, the government will be in a very difficult position. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Are you not afraid of other kinds of dangers? After all, we had a debate on the budget in the Sejm, but the president does not have to sign the budget, anyway. It may turn out that a completely new situation will emerge. What will the coalition and you do then?

[Miller] Of course, Mr. President does not have to sign the budget, but the budget will be in force anyway because I am convinced that the Sejm would reject a presidential veto. That is because even those Sejm deputies who voted against the budget when it was being voted would vote against the president right now. Simply put, the Sejm will be aware of what it would mean. A nonrejection of a presidential veto would mean the Sejm's dissolution. I think that, if the president were to make such a move, the intention would be to have the Sejm dissolved. Well, the fact is that the Sejm will successfully defend itself against that. So I would simply urge Mr. President to just sign the budget. [passage omitted]

Public Support for Quick Privatization Wanes

PM2203143394 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 14 Mar 94 p 7

[Article by Alicja Ogieglo: "Who Benefits From Privatization?"]

[Text] It is certain that Silesian Bank [BSK] employees are delighted that their bank has been sold, just as the work force of the Kwidzyn Paper Factory is pleased with the sale of its plant to the Americans. Kwidzyn workers used the money from the sale of their shares to take final leave of the old realities of People's Poland: They bought apartments, cars, and furniture. The crew of the Rafako manufacturing plant was slightly less ecstatic in the last stages of the sale of its enterprise because its shares did not make a profit as high as those of the BSK. In this context, what can the remaining 80 percent of the Polish population say? So far, it has not had a chance to snatch for itself even a tiny part of the privatization profits.

At the same time, certain groups of politicians intend to capitalize on the prevailing public mood and hamper the progress of privatization while invoking the following maxim: "It is preferable to carry it out slowly—but methodically and fairly." Consequently, we will not see the issue of share certificates as early as promised by the National Investment Funds Act. If we did, might not pensioners and employees of the budget-funded sector, who were supposed to be the first in line to participate in and benefit from the Polish mass privatization program, get too rich for someone's liking?

A new problem, which was demonstrated clearly by new in-depth social research studies carried out in 1993, is posed by employees' growing discontent with working conditions provided by private enterprise owners. There is also evidence of increasing criticism of private owners based on dissatisfaction with other factors besides poor working conditions, such as management methods that undermine employers' dignity and irrational economic and organizational decisions.

The traditional mistrust of foreign capital and prejudice against foreign investors still persist, although, in practice, firms that have accepted foreign capital tend to reserve higher praise for it than for our own, domestic capital. Recently, it has been recommended that a system of public monitoring and control of the implementation of the privatization program be introduced on a regular basis.

To begin with, the Mass Privatization Program [PPP] was launched with a considerable degree of public approval (with a mean value of 70 percent, obtained in a number of separate surveys). It generated associated expectations of an economic miracle and elevation of wide circles of society into the elite realm of private property owners. Even after a notable fall in share values in 1993, the level of public acceptance of the privatization program was still relatively high. Consequently, the minister for ownership transformations continued to enjoy considerable public support. And so, once the Privatization Act was passed by parliament in April 1993, the PPP could have confidently "kicked off" on schedule. By now we would have been approaching the stage leading to mass distribution of and trading in share certificates.

First, the level of the PPP's public acceptance declined as a result of the election campaign. Even so, during Prime Minister Pawlak's "honeymoon" period, public approval for privatization still reached some 50 percent. At the same time, however, the proportion of advocates of the view that privatization should be carried out at a much slower pace than previously increased sharply (to 47 percent). Representatives of opinions that deny the sense of accelerating the privatization process do not expect to get rich themselves. In their view, enterprises should be sold exclusively to those buyers who will undertake to maintain employment levels (60 percent).

In addition, the predominant view is that privatization should start with enterprises that are in debt rather than with those in sound financial condition. Recent opinions stressing a growing degree of discontent with the effects of privatization to date influence politicians in their negative view on the PPP program as a whole. It is true that the recently appointed Selection Committee, whose creation already involved considerable difficulties, has set out on a course of talks with the firms that took part in the initial sales tender, but it has scheduled the completion of the selection process aimed at identification of parent companies and candidates to the position of members of National Investment Fund supervisory boards for the second quarter of this year. Meanwhile, enterprises that may even want to participate in the program and that would regard it as a move in their own economic interest, tend to attend more closely to matters of immediate importance, such as local and employee interests. At the same time, many of them suffer the consequences of a deteriorating financial condition. It seems that the PPP program has become a scapegoat here, as a victim of political maneuvering. Those who are responsible for decisions in this area are probably hoping that someone else will eventually pay for the consequences of the delay in the introduction of the privatization program.

Central Europe States' Investment Risk Compared

PM2303094194 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish 16 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Zbigniew Weglarek: "RP (Polish Republic) Stands For Risky Proposition"]

[Text] Although, according to Western experts' generally consistent opinion, Poland is the first country in Central Europe that has managed to halt the progress of deepening recession and begin a process of emerging from the crisis, it is still seen as posing a particularly high investment risk. This view is borne out by, among other things, an opinion survey commissioned by the Polish Development Bank [Polski Bank Rozwoju SA] and carried out by the Market Economy Research Institute. The former GDR, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary were chosen for comparison purposes. The Institute's respondents, selected from a number of Western firms conducting business with the former CEMA as well as international consultancy institutions, were asked to draw a ranking list arranging the above-mentioned countries according to, first, their importance in business relations (the market attractiveness factor) and, second, the degree of risk involved in placing investment in them.

Our place on the list is very high as regards the attractiveness of our market to foreign business. Using a five-point scale, the consultancy firms awarded 4.5 points to Poland (and, respectively, 4 points to Hungary, 3.5 points to the Czech Republic, 3 points to the former GDR, and 1.8 points to Slovakia). Business firms gave us a slightly lower rating (3.3 points), but, even so, we came

before all of the other contestants. The next country on the list, Hungary, was allocated 2.5 points, the Czech Republic 2.4 points, the former GDR 2.2 points, and Slovakia 1.9 points.

A different picture emerged when it came to evaluating the risk factor involved in investing in our group of countries. The businessmen believe that Poland and Slovakia were leaders in the "high-risk" stakes. The international consultancy firms drew up a list with a slightly different order. They have the least confidence in Slovakia. However, Poland comes a close second to Slovakia.

Analyses carried out by the Market Economy Research Institute attempted to uncover the reasons for this particular ranking order, which is so unfavorable to us. Among other things, techniques developed in the West and adapted for use in our country were used to draw up a "sector map" designed to present a picture of the current levels of our enterprises' competition potential. The map comprises five sections. The first section lists industry sectors for which, in the present state of our economy, the risk of bringing in outside capital is considered to be "small"—in other words, those that promise relatively high profits, with an advantageous correlation of outlays to results. The second section of the map comprises "medium-risk" industry sectors; the third, "increased-risk"; the fourth, "high-risk"; and the fifth, "particularly-high-risk."

Startling as it may seem, from the economic viewpoint, the sectors listed as involving small and medium investment risk represent more than 50 percent of current industrial production! Another group of sectors, representing approximately 14.4 percent of output, are relatively close to the potentially profitable zone, although they require appropriate efficiency-enhancement measures (the "increased-risk zone"). Sectors that have been described as representing high risk for potential investment and that thus promise many difficulties for firms that might decide to invest in them turn out approximately 7.8 percent of our industrial production. Finally, sectors that constitute particularly high risk for potential investors and that, consequently, are at present the least attractive—or, to be more precise, that lag furthest behind others and thus threaten the hypothetical investors with many unpleasant surprises—represent slightly more than 27 percent of industrial production.

Among the sectors that already offer only small risk to investors are the herb industry, the match-manufacturing industry, the sugar industry, and the pharmaceutical industry, although the last requires a very high degree of specialist knowledge and experience. At the other end of the scale, very high risk is involved in investing in such sectors as the high-technology optical, aircraft, and computer industries, but also, among others, the potato-growing industry, the spirits and yeast-manufacturing industries, and the footwear industry, none of which, or so it would seem, present particular technological difficulties hard to master for any country with a relatively high level of technological and industrial advancement and expertise, and whose work force has at least moderate professional and technical qualifications.

Through an additional survey conducted among foreign businessmen and business consultants, the Market Economy Research Institute set out to ascertain the most prominent reason for anxiety concerning the potential involvement of foreign investment in the five countries listed above. In the case of the former GDR, for example, social tension gave the greatest cause for concern; in the Czech Republic, legislative and economic difficulties were listed as most worrying; in Slovakia, there was concern over economic problems; and, in Hungary, economic and social factors alike were found to give reason for anxiety.

In Poland, the chief risk factors are political instability and imperfect legislation. No other country of our group of five received even a comparably poor political rating from the potential investors consulted in the survey.

OPZZ: Different Standards Used for Unions

WS2303113994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by B.I.W. and P.W.R.: "OPZZ Demands Explanations From Prime Minister; Experts for Government and Solidarity Begin Their Work"]

[Text] *A team of experts from Solidarity and the government, which is to deal with the demands of the trade union [TU], has begun its work. The chairwoman of the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ] sent a fax to the prime minister in which she asked him to explain whether it is true that the Council of Ministers is supposed to accept or reject legal documents prepared by the experts.*

"We absolutely reject the possibility of such a situation. We cannot have decisions that will be binding on everyone but that will only come out of government-Solidarity talks. We also have something to say here," Ewa Spychalska told RZECZPOSPOLITA.

Solidarity activists have been saying the whole time that the team of experts is supposed to deal with the trade union's demands, so that they may be referred to the government in due course.

"The experts will transform the demands into the language of legal acts, while the Council of Ministers will make the political decision whether to approve," Piotr Zak, a spokesman for the [Solidarity] National Commission told us. But the OPZZ rules out such a situation.

"My feeling is that there is a discrepancy between the information I received from the prime minister in our conversation and the way the media reported on the results of the prime minister's talks with Solidarity,"

OPZZ Chairwoman Ewa Spychalska said Tuesday [22 March], during a break in a session of the OPZZ Council's Presidium.

Spychalska is concerned about the fact that, according to media reports, the experts for the government and Solidarity are to work out legislative drafts regarding implementation of the trade union's demands and then submit them to the Council of Ministers for approval.

"That suggests a different procedure used by the government in its talks with my colleagues from Solidarity," Spychalska said.

The OPZZ chairwoman had been informed that all the experts were to do was to put the demands of Solidarity in a certain order and then refer them to multiparty negotiations within negotiating teams or within the Trilateral Commission because the "demands apply to all employees, not just to Solidarity members." So she sent a fax to the prime minister asking for an explanation.

"In every civilized country, differences are resolved within trilateral arrangements. Representatives of all trade unions must be partners for deciding issues that concern all employees," Spychalska said. She also added that, when it comes to a point where the government treats various trade unions differently, the OPZZ will make decisions on what to do next. But she refused to explain what kinds of decisions these could be, apart from saying that they will try to get the desired results "with every legally allowed method."

The OPZZ is waiting for the prime minister's decision regarding the activity of experts for the government and Solidarity. When asked to comment on the OPZZ chairwoman's doubts, Dariusz Jadowski, director of the Government's Press Office, only cited an excerpt from a joint communique issued after the Pawlak-Krzaklewski meeting: "Results of the prime minister's meeting with the chairmen of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 'Solidarity' and other trade unions, like the results of the experts' work, will be presented to a session of the Council of Ministers and debated there."

—The following trade unions declared that they are joining the OPZZ: The Polish Bailiffs Trade Union and the Copper-Industry Employees Trade Union. The latter was a member of the trade union center as a member of the Miners Trade Union Federation, which it left along with the ZFFG [expansion unknown]. In December of 1991, the Copper Industry Employees Trade Union received the legal status of an all-Polish trade union. Ryszard Zbrzyzny, its chairman, headed a strike committee that conducted a 32-day strike in the KGHM SA "Polish Copper" in July and August 1992. According to Zbrzyzny, the trade union has 12,000 members.

—The Presidium of the National Commission of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" has issued an appeal to the Brown Coal National Section not to begin an active strike that was planned for 24 March and to wait until the strike headquarters issues a decision.

Iliescu on Turkish Relations, Regional Issues

TA2003190094 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1600 GMT 20 Mar 94

[Text] Romanian President Ion Iliescu has said that relations between his country and Turkey are on the best level possible. Iliescu announced that he is waiting impatiently for President Suleyman Demirel's visit to further bilateral relations. Iliescu made these statements to a group of Turkish correspondents in Bucharest while answering their questions on bilateral relations and regional issues. Serdar Dimli reports from Bucharest:

[Begin Dimli recording] Both Iliescu and Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Viorel Melescanu defined the relations between Turkey and Romania as excellent. Iliescu said: Our relations with Turkey are on the best possible terms and are being perpetually furthered in all areas. Demirel's visit will be a significant step toward furthering and strengthening these relations. We are giving exceptional importance to this dialogue in view of the roles both countries play in the stability of Europe.

In answer to a question on the kind of assistance he expects from Turkey regarding Romania's liberalization and privatization programs, Iliescu answered: We are currently undergoing the same experiences that other countries have gone through and we hope to make good use of these in our efforts at liberalization and the creation of a market economy. We also want to take advantage of Turkey's experience in establishing free economic zones since we see this as the most important step toward a modern economy. We are still conducting work toward establishing free economic zones in Constanta and Sulina on the shores of the Black Sea. Joint investment projects to be established between the two countries will contribute significantly toward the development and externalizing of the economies.

In answer to another question on his views regarding the future of the Romania-Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project and on ways to quicken this process, Iliescu said: It is to the advantage of all that regional countries develop their relations in all areas. Today, however, there is a political stability issue in the region and this situation is preventing regional countries from furthering their relations. The relations between Turkey and Romania should be an example of countries that make great efforts to establish stability. This kind of cooperation expanding to all the countries in the region will contribute toward the development of the project.

Romania, a regional country which has common borders with Serbia, closely follows the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia. While answering questions regarding this issue, Iliescu said that he does not think a military approach to this issue is right. Iliescu said that it is necessary to find a peaceful solution to the issue with the help of international organizations and other countries. Iliescu indicated that the agreement reached between the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croats could be a good basis for a peaceful solution.

In answer to a question on Russia's military presence in the region, Iliescu said that he is not at all happy with another country's military presence in the region.

SRI Deputy Dismissed for Leaking Information

AU2203142694 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Dorina Baesu: "The SRI Director Settles Accounts"]

[Text] The conflict between Virgil Magureanu [director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, SRI] and his deputy did not start yesterday. At about this time last year, information was circulating in political circles to the effect that Dumitru Cristea was trying to make contact with various opposition leaders—and not only them—to point out to them that he might be a good SRI director, better than Virgil Magureanu. Had they accepted the suggestion, it would have provoked a scandal following the discussions on the SRI report in the parliament and they would have had to vote against Virgil Magureanu's confirmation in the position. Cristea even met with some of those opposition leaders, while others avoided any contact with him, seeing it as a trap, and did not wish to get involved in private, internal SRI scandals. In those days there were even rumors about how Virgil Magureanu had dismissed Dumitru Cristea.

However, this did not happen because Cristea fought hard for his position. Slowly, slowly, after having been confirmed in his position, the SRI director removed from their positions those people who were supporting his deputy. General Gheorghe Diaconescu, the head of the counterespionage service, was one of them, and now even Cristea's turn has come.

Sources close to the SRI director affirm that Gheorghe Diaconescu was not removed from office because he was involved in the Pancea affair but simply because he was an incompetent person and a hard drinker. As far as Dumitru Cristea is concerned, the same source affirms that he was also involved in leaking information to a known extremist magazine. According to our source, published texts in that magazine that were signed Al.I. Manescu, were edited by somebody who is a professional in the field of information, namely, former General Neagu Cosma. For a while he was putting out the magazine "Espionage-Counterespionage," which he was writing almost entirely alone, and whose style very much resembled the aforementioned items in the extremist magazine.

Nastase Allegedly Blocking Coalition Plan

AU2203142494 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Ana Maria Vintan: "It Is Increasingly Difficult With Oliviu Gherman"]

[Text] About this time last year, the ruling party [Social Democracy Party of Romania, PDSR] was waving the banner of the coalition government, which should have united all political forces in a brotherly embrace. Now the same tune is being sung again, but this time in a little more pragmatic manner, allegedly to break the current parliamentary bottleneck, which is becoming increasingly unpleasant for the PDSR leaders.

Nothing is being done now, just as nothing was done then, for the simple reason that there is no desire for any action. A member of the ruling party leadership told us a few days ago that under the current circumstances it is impossible to establish a PDSR-opposition government. The strongest explanation for this is the danger that the PDSR might split as a result of such a government. "There are too many of those who oppose such an alliance to allow us to disregard their wishes. The main promoter of this opinion is none other than Adrian Nastase, the executive president of the party. He is afraid of an alliance with the opposition not because he is a member of the conservative wing of the party but because he is a very cautious man, even excessively cautious. However, in politics, one also needs courage to assume certain risks." Adrian Nastase does not want to take any risks. He believes that it is too dangerous to break off with former allies merely for the sake of the opposition. Even though on diplomatic channels he is constantly receiving signals that confirm the wish of the West that the opposition should participate in the government.

Because of his obstinacy, Adrian Nastase's relations with the honorary president of the PDSR, Oliviu Gherman, have considerably deteriorated of late. He would be ready to take risks and has already succeeded in convincing even Ion Iliescu about the importance of showing greater courage in politics.

Gherman's latest disappointment is that it is that same Adrian Nastase who has recently saved a well-known extremist leader. Afraid that sacrificing this extremist leader would bring about isolation and the loss of certain faithful allies, PDSR Executive President Adrian Nastase made every possible effort and definitively eliminated the danger that seemed inevitable for the leader.

Nastase Cited on Transylvania, UDMR Stances

AU1903203194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 94

[Text] A meeting of the presidents, vice presidents, and other representatives of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] branches from 16 counties in Transylvania and Banat took place in Cluj-Napoca today. The meeting was attended by PDSR Executive President Adrian Nastase, other members of the Central Executive Bureau of this political group, members of the governments, and PDSR senators and deputies.

At a news conference after the meeting, Adrian Nastase said that the PDSR meeting is indicative of the party's concern with Transylvania and its problems. He emphasized that his party has its own position on the issue of national and interethnic relations. After enumerating certain conclusions he has reached during his discussions with the economic managers in the county and with the command of the 4th Army of Transylvania, Adrian Nastase referred to the meeting's main message, which is that the PDSR wants to enhance its positions throughout the country, including in Transylvania, thus rejecting regional approaches to solving problems and favoring the promotion of a policy in accordance with the norms of social- democracy and with the requirements of our country's geostrategic environment.

Adrian Nastase said that Transylvania's problems should be tackled from an angle indicative of the fact that, generally speaking, it is up to the country's government to find solutions to these problems, while the political parties should not play a mediating role. Selective and biased historism should be replaced by European standards, while the governmental and state dimension should play a greater role in tackling Transylvania's problems.

Adrian Nastase said that PDSR's image should be improved and its identity as a party clearly brought to the fore. In conclusion, he said that it is important to unequivocally define the relationship between the PDSR and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], particularly since there are certain UDMR positions that are incompatible with the country's Constitution and we are faced with a certain ambiguity promoted by this party.

After his speech, Adrian Nastase answered the questions of journalists for more than an hour. Among the issues raised, we would like to mention the following: the local relations between the PDSR and other parties, particularly the UDMR and the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]; the discussions conducted by the ruling party with the opposition parties and with the parties of the governmental arch; and the problems facing the young generation and ways and means for their resolution.

Answering a question about early elections, Nastase said that PDSR considers them a mistake, since they would block the economic and political mechanisms, something which would have serious consequences at the domestic and foreign level, our correspondent Adriana Olteanu reports.

Mayors Group Calls For 'Real Local Autonomy'

AU1903203094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 94

[Text] A meeting on setting up the group of mayors and deputy mayors of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] took place in Timisoara today. The goal of setting up this group—as a party organizational structure, without legal status—is to ensure the support of the locally elected representatives of this party by the central party leadership and the county branches, so as to enable them to optimally carry out their activity in town halls and to implement PAC policies in the sphere of local administration.

A communique released by PAC announces that the meeting was attended by PAC President Professor Nicolae Manolescu, members of the Steering Collegium, parliamentarians, 47 mayors and deputy mayors, vice presidents of county councils, and the presidents of the party's county branches.

In conclusion, the meeting endorsed and released an appeal to the citizens of the localities administered by the PAC representatives as well as a statement of the Group of PAC Mayors and Deputy Mayors. The statement points out that the local autonomy proclaimed by Law 69/1991 of Romania's Constitution has never taken effect. The disastrous situation of the country's localities, which are devoid of sources of income, is mainly due to the constant blocking of a package of laws of utmost importance for the normal functioning of the local councils. The statement draws the attention of the leadership of the Local Public Administration Department on the negative effects of this obstructionist policy, which is mainly felt by the population. The statement also stresses that the group of PAC mayors and deputy mayors will constantly promote the idea of the need for legislation to facilitate real local autonomy. The group considers it as its duty to appeal to all national and international forums capable of influencing the policy of the current government.

In conclusion, the statement expresses the conviction that their colleagues from other parties or with similar political viewpoints will join the efforts of the PAC mayors and deputy mayors.

UN Confirms Serbs Removing Artillery

AU2303142494 Paris AFP in English 1354 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, March 23 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serb army has withdrawn some heavy artillery from a disputed location at the edge of the 20-kilometre (12-mile) exclusion zone around the capital, UN Protection Force spokesman Simon Macdowall said here Wednesday. The Serbs had taken away 13 of 30 artillery pieces, leaving the remainder under the supervision of Canadian UNPROFOR units who came across the cache last Sunday, Major Macdowall said. The weapons left behind included 10 large calibre mortars, four howitzers, two T-55 tanks and an anti-aircraft gun. The cache was found in Cifluk village north-west of Sarajevo. The Serbs said it was just outside the exclusion zone, basing their calculations on Sarajevo's traditional centrepoint the cathedral. But UNPROFOR's map used a reference point one kilometre (slightly more than half a mile) to the west, putting Cifluk within the exclusion zone, Macdowall noted.

The matter was sorted out late on Monday at Pale, stronghold of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb republic, in talks between Bosnian Serb chief Radovan Karadzic and UNPROFOR's Dutch chief of staff General Adrian van Baal. The exclusion zone came into effect on February 20.

Serbs Continue To Violate Sarajevo Cease-Fire

AU2203194694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] The aggressor continues to violate the Sarajevo cease-fire by opening fire from various types of infantry weapons. They opened barrage fire toward Marin Dvor from the direction of the (?Bosut) Barracks. Chetnik snipers also attacked the district of Dobrinja and Brekin Potok. One explosion of a cumulative mortar bomb was also registered. It was fired from [word indistinct] on Stup district.

The members of the United Nations Protection Forces came under fire from the aggressors' positions in Nedjarici again today. They responded in kind to the fire that came from Stup hill. This was reported by the Information Service of the 1st Army Corps.

Renewed Serb Shelling in Bugojno

AU2303095994

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 23 March carries in its regular 7-minute newscast two reports on the fighting in the Bugojno and Bihac areas.

Correspondent Emir Avdakovic, reporting from Bugojno on the situation in the past 24 hours, says that "Bugojno is a veritable hell, as the city is pulverized by dozens of the most destructive howitzer and tank shells. From their lairs in the mountains encircling Bugojno, particularly from the direction of Kupres, the chetniks are continuing to shell the town. The fervor with which they are doing this is proportional to their failures in direct clashes with the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army who have courageously and effectively repelled the enemy's attempts at infantry breakthroughs, with a further 15 chetniks being killed in the process. I say further, because in recent clashes on the Bugojno front over 60 chetniks were killed. According to reliable information, chaos rules in their ranks. The members of the UN Protection Force's British Battalion stationed in Bugojno have witnessed all this. For the time being, they are silently observing from their armored personnel carriers the horrors that the citizens of Bugojno are being forced to endure. This morning the town was once again shelled and the general alarm remains in force."

Bihac correspondent Mirza Sadikovic reports that "throughout the night, the Serbian aggressor used artillery and tanks to shell the Bihac and Cazin areas. The attacks were particularly fierce after 2300 and in the early morning hours, when they shelled the town centers and the roads linking Bihac and Cazin. The aggressor is obviously employing a new strategy of shelling civilian targets in those periods when there is less chance of NATO planes patrolling the skies over Bihac. The situation on the defense lines remains the same with the chetniks continuing their bestial attacks, alternating artillery and infantry attacks. Actually, there is not a single inch of the defense lines on the Grmusko-Srbljanksi plateau, Hasin Vrh, and Barakovac that has not been hit by several shells overnight and in the early morning hours. [Words indistinct] the Serbian aggressor has been sporadically attacking in the theater of operations of the Headquarters of the Croatian Defense Council on the Pljesivica part of the front, where snipers are particularly active this morning, while the area of Skoce has come under artillery attack. All the defense lines are firm and stable. [Abdic's] paramilitary forces have not been quiet overnight and this morning. They are attacking the defenders with all (?available means) in the areas of Krivaja, Leskovac, and Trs [words indistinct]."

Serbs Use Chemical Agents on Bihac Front

AU2203154894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic]

[Excerpt] There have been new artillery-infantry attacks on the defenders' lines on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau, Hasin Vrh, and the Bihac part of the front. The hundreds of howitzer, mortar, and tank shells that have landed on parts of the defense lines and the shelling of Cazin, Bihac, and the surrounding areas this afternoon mark the 43d day of the Serbian aggressor's offensives on the Bihac region.

Our defenders are heroically resisting the wolves from Mount Ozren who have again arrived on the Bihac front. The fact that they used chemical agents in attacks today sufficiently illustrates the behavior by Karadzic's terrorists. When they failed to break the defenders' resistance, they turned against city districts. Substantial material damage was caused in Cazin. Some civilians were wounded, but fortunately no one was killed.

In addition, the rage by Abdic's paramilitary has continued in the border areas of the Cazin municipality. The targets of secessionists' attacks are the same ones they have been mercilessly destroying and torching since last night. They are also killing domestic animals and expelling people. A large number of refugees from these areas, especially from Krivaja, Liskovac, and (?Trzac), arrived in Cazin today. [passage omitted]

Serbs Hold Up Aid Convoy Bound for Maglaj

AU2203213594 Paris AFP in English 2125 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Zagreb, March 22 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs have held up a convoy of humanitarian aid for the Moslem enclave of Maglaj in northern Bosnia for at least 24 hours, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said here Tuesday.

The convoy, which left the Croatian capital Zagreb on Monday morning, was forced to turn back the same day by Serbian forces controlling the bridge at Gradiska, which links Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, said UNHCR spokesman Peter Kessler.

The convoy arrived back in Zagreb on Monday night and left again on Tuesday morning. It reached Gradiska again at noon and was undergoing checks, Kessler said, blaming the delay on "bureaucratic difficulties."

Bosnian Serbs on Saturday lifted a nine-month siege of Maglaj.

The town's population of around 25,000, plus up to 75,000 others in the surrounding enclave, had been forced to rely on air drops for food since October.

He said he hoped the convoy would get to Banja Luka, the main town under Serbian control in northern Bosnia, in time to spend the night there before continuing its journey to Maglaj.

The convoy is made up of 30 trucks, 10 of them bound for Maglaj, and the rest for Banja Luka, Doboj, to the north, and Zenica in central Bosnia.

On Sunday, nine UNHCR trucks loaded with 80 tonnes of food and medicine managed to get into Maglaj without hindrance from Zenica, 70 kilometres (45 miles) to the south.

Bosnian Serbs gave the go-ahead the same day for the second now delayed convoy.

HVO Extremists Continue To Violate Cease-Fire

AU2203154694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] The extreme sections of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] are continuing to violate the cease-fire agreement. Provocative fire was again opened with infantry arms. One member of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was wounded near Plocari in the Fojnica commune.

In the Bakovicaka Ciptonja region, the fighters of the HVO used incendiary ammunition and set ablaze the forest close to our defense lines.

Members of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] can confirm what the situation on the ground is. As the Information Service of the 1st Army Corps reports, our units are observing the cease-fire agreement.

Ganic: Success of Agreement Depends on Croats

AU2203174494 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 94 p 8

[Interview with Presidency member Ejup Ganic by Renato Cemerika; place and date not given: "The Agreement Is Our Success"]

[Text] *Until recently, Ejup Ganic did not hide the fact that he wanted the war to continue and that his dream was to conquer Vitez in order to round up the production program for equipping the Muslim army. With the intention of finding out whether he had changed his views, especially those on Croat relations, we asked him to comment on the preliminary agreement signed in Washington and to assess the possibility of implementing the agreement.*

[Ganic] The agreement is a political success for the Presidency and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, because we have been fighting against the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the very beginning. We started out together with the Croats against the Serbian aggressor, who not only wanted to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina but also conquer all of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a large part of Croatia, but the creation of Herceg-Bosna—Greater Croatia—resulted in a conflict between the Croats and the Muslims. This agreement is necessary to preserve the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the Bosnian Croats proposed at their assembly in Sarajevo last month and the Muslim—Bosniak leadership—in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The success of the agreement depends on the Croatian side, especially the extreme part of the leadership from Grude.

[Cemerika] What about the extreme part of the Muslim leadership?

[Ganic] I think all Muslims are doing their best to preserve the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of their politics.

[Cemerika] Some Muslim generals do not believe in the political solution and they do not trust politicians.

[Ganic] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency—that is, its president—is the supreme commander of the army, and since we now have an organized army that gets its orders from its supreme commander, I do not believe that there are officers in our army who do not obey those orders.

[Cemerika] If this agreement with the Croats is successful, how will you arrange your relations with the Serbs?

[Ganic] Bosnia-Herzegovina is a country that belongs to all of its citizens, and every honest Serb has his or her place in that country. We will try to come to an agreement with those Serbs who still believe in the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina because the agreement with the Croats is not aimed against the Serbs.

[Cemerika] Has Izetbegovic authorized Silajdzic to make this agreement?

[Ganic] Mr. Silajdzic cannot sign any agreement without authorization from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency—that is, its president, Alija Izetbegovic.

[Cemerika] If the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly rejects the agreement, will Mr. Izetbegovic also reject it?

[Ganic] We are a democratic country with a democratic system and the Assembly elected by the people, and if the Assembly rejects the agreement, then no one has the right to accept it, although I am sure it will be unanimously adopted by the Assembly.

[Cemerika] During our conversation, you have shown that you are in favor of a peaceful solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, you are famous for your "hard" views in your statements on solving the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem and you have advocated war more often than peace. Can you explain this change?

[Ganic] First of all, I did not make such statements and, second, every new event deserves a new comment.

[Cemerika] If a confederation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is formed, will you lose your position?

[Ganic] (laughter) There will be democratic elections!

Presidency Member: Herceg-Bosna 'Never Existed'

AU2203200294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Report by Nada al-Isa from Zagreb]

[Text] Ivo Komsic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today held a news conference in Zagreb. Here is a report by our Zagreb correspondent Nada al-Isa:

[al-Isa] The first result of the Washington agreement is already evident, the clashes between the Croats and the Muslims have virtually stopped. This marks a turning point in general Croat-Bosniak relations. This was stated by Ivo Komsic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at a news conference in Zagreb today. However, the agreement is still only a preliminary agreement since the public, the people will have to express their view on it, Komsic said. He said that the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina will give its final word on the Washington agreement on 28 March.

The Bosnian Serbs should now be included in the negotiations. We should talk to them on the return of the occupied territories. The Serbs can join the federation, Komsic said, but parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina joining Serbia is out of the question. They can only take a bit of Bosnian dust, whatever is left on their shoes.

Asked to comment on the statement by Croatian President Tudjman at the news conference today that there is a possibility of a part of the so-called Srpska republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina joining Serbia, Dr. Komsic said that he did not know where Dr. Tudjman obtained this information, and that this was out of the question.

Komsic expects some difficulties in the implementation of the Croatian-Bosniak agreement, which could come from individual persons. The implementation of the agreement will be hindered by the same persons who artificially caused the Croatian-Muslim clash.

It would be interesting to see what the reaction will be here in Croatia to the statement by Dr. Komsic regarding the so-called Herceg-Bosna. Replying to the question as to what would now happen with the so-called Herceg-Bosna, Dr. Komsic said: Nothing, because it has never existed. Only the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina has and will continue to exist. All artificial creations must completely disappear.

Assembly To Adopt New Constitution

LD2203185294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] *The Washington agreement will be adopted by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in Sarajevo on 28 March. This was announced by Ivo Komsic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and president of the Croat National Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosiljka Bucan reports from the news conference at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Zagreb.*

[Bucan] Unlike other agreements on the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, the Washington agreement's clauses are precisely defined. They are, according to Ivo Komsic:

[Komsic] "At midnight on Monday Bosnia-Herzegovina will have its new constitution and will begin to live

according to the new constitution. According to the new constitution elections should be held in six months. Until then the assembly will be a constituent assembly and will pass only one law—the election law."

[Bucan] The Washington agreement is the basis for the resolution of the entire crisis. The Serb aggressor side can reject or accept the agreement. If they accept, they would have to do the following:

[Komsic] "They must give up the objectives of their aggression and must try to recreate the prewar situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will be a very difficult and long process."

[Bucan] The agreement introduces a new dimension in the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis. The military option was not considered and we hope for a political resolution of the problem.

Bridge Opens to Pedestrians in Sarajevo

AU2303104794 Paris AFP in English 1040 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, March 23 (AFP)—A bridge linking the Serb and Moslem-held parts of Sarajevo opened to pedestrians Wednesday in a symbolic breakthrough in ending the siege of the Bosnian capital.

The first pedestrians walked across the UN-held bridge shortly before noon.

Road Opens to Traffic

LD2303114494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1113 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—At the prearranged hour this morning, the corridor linking the Serb suburbs of Lukavica and Ilidza via Sarajevo airport was opened to traffic.

Under a recent agreement between the Serb and Muslim side, a corridor linking the Muslim-controlled suburbs of Butmir and Dobrinja will also open today.

First, buses with civilians on board set off from Ilidza for Lukavica and Pale this morning. A bus left for Belgrade.

For the first time since the airport was handed over to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] control, people from Serb Sarajevo were able to use the Lukavica-Ilidza road. There have been no traffic problems so far.

The Serb fighters bridge (formerly Brotherhood and Unity bridge), which links Grbavica with the Muslim part of Sarajevo, has not yet been opened to civilians because the Muslim side is demanding that Serb authorities in the Novo Sarajevo municipality remove the Srpska republic's state symbols from the Serb side of the border crossing.

The bridge and the Sarajevo-Visoko corridor via Vogosca are, however, expected to open to traffic later today.

Krajisnik: Negotiations on Airport Not Over Yet

LD2203160294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1533 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 22 (TANJUG)—The President of the Assembly of the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) Momcilo Krajisnik said Tuesday that no one should take the responsibility of unilaterally opening the Tuzla airfield, but that he feared that anything was possible today.

Krajisnik said this in an interview to Radio Jagodina, commenting the announcement of Moslem Radio Sarajevo that Tuesday the airfield near Tuzla would be opened. Tuzla is a Moslem enclave in northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On Tuesday a U.N. plane landed on Tuzla airfield with the U.N. Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi on board. This was interpreted as the reopening of the airfield for humanitarian flights.

The spokesman of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Silvana Foa denied this stating that the Tuzla airfield would not be opened before Bosnian Serbs and Moslems agreed on the way the incoming cargo is to be controlled.

The Serb side has not reached a final agreement with the Moslems on the opening of the Tuzla airfield, there is only an agreement with the Russians on its opening under certain conditions, negotiations on the subject are not over yet, Krajisnik said.

Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev reached an agreement early this month in Moscow on the opening of the Tuzla airfield for humanitarian needs. Fearing that the Moslems could use the airfield to bring in arms the Serbs asked for the incoming cargo to be checked by Russian peacekeepers and Serb observers.

The Tuzla military airfield was closed in May 1992, a month after the war between the local Serbs, Croats and Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out.

Krajisnik said that on Wednesday the RS parliament would examine how Bosnia-Herzegovina would be constituted, the future relations with the Moslem-Croat federation and the platform of the Serb side in the next round of talks.

Bosnian Croats and Moslems have signed an agreement in the White House, under strong U.S. pressure, on the establishment of a Croat-Moslem federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on general principles of its later confederation with the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia. The question of whether the Bosnian Serbs will join the federation, insisted upon by Washington, has been left open.

Stressing that the deputies cannot overlook the question of the division of the territories between the Serb side and the Moslem-Croat federation Krajisnik said that the

"Serbs own 64 per cent of the territory and we shall insist on this actual ownership in all subsequent talks".

He added however, that they were ready to agree to certain concessions in the percentage of the territory if it meant that compact areas would be created. "This is nevertheless far below the 50 per cent of the territory spoken about by the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher", the RS assembly president said.

UNHCR Says Airport Opening Delayed

LD2203152294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1457 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Geneva, March 22 (TANJUG)—The airfield near Tuzla, a Moslem enclave in northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, will not be opened until Serbs and Moslems agree on how the cargo will be checked, Sylvana Foa, spokeswoman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), said on Tuesday.

Foa could not specify when the airfield would be put into operation, except for confirming that technically, the facility was ready to reopen. Everything is ready, only an agreement of the two sides is awaited, she said.

The fact that a U.N. plane with U.N. Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi landed at Tuzla airfield on Tuesday has been interpreted as the renewal of the humanitarian bridge.

The airfield near Tuzla was closed on May 1992, a month after the war in the former Yugoslav [words indistinct] Herzegovina had broken out between local Serbs, Croats and Moslems.

Tuzla is a Moslem enclave in the Serb-controlled territory. Bosnian Serbs, who fear that the airfield may be used for arms shipments to Moslems, insist that their monitors and Russian peacekeepers check all incoming cargo. Foa said last week's humanitarian effort was the most successful since the UNHCR started operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 9,400 metric tonnes of aid delivered last week almost constitute the optimum level of deliveries, she added.

In collaboration with UNICEF's organization for children in exile which is based in Zagreb, the UNHCR has launched an operation to bring together children and their parents. Foa said about 20,000 children aged up to 18 were seeking their parents. They have no identification papers and many of them are too little to know who their parents are and where they might be.

Aid Leaves for Tuzla Unhindered

LD2103155494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1518 GMT 21 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Zvornik, March 21 (TANJUG)—A convoy of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), carrying 112 tonnes of flour, on Monday unhindered and safely crossed Bosnian Serb territory on its way for Moslem-held Tuzla, eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, TANJUG learned from Bosnian Serb military sources.

Owing to the efforts of the Bosnian Serbs, the relief aid ground routes towards Tuzla and other Moslem-, i.e. Croat-held towns in Bosnia, have so far remained safe and open.

Bosnian Serb military sources once again rejected claims by the international community that the opening of the Tuzla airport is "necessary" out of humanitarian reasons, and expressed doubt that other reasons and intentions lie behind the action.

The Bosnian Serbs, fearing that the Moslems could use the airport to illegally acquire arms under the guise of humanitarian aid, have made its opening conditional that the airport is monitored by Russian peacekeepers and that Serb observers control the cargo checks.

Commentary: Aggressors Responsible for Peace

AU2203212694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Commentary by Omer Ibrahimovic]

[Text] At its 20 March session, the Serbian Consultative Council decided to propose to the Croatian Coordination Committee and the Council of the Congress of the Bosnian Muslim Intellectuals to hold a joint convention of reconciliation between the Bosniaks, the Serbs, and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here is a commentary by Omer Ibrahimovic:

[Ibrahimovic] I do not doubt the good intentions of those proposing this convention. However, it is obvious that this proposal was not a result of more elaborate thinking. I suspect that it was someone's hasty idea that was instantly turned into a conclusion of this important body. The initial reaction to this proposal must be a question: Why should these three people seek reconciliation when they have not been involved in a conflict against one another?

Even the birds know the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not the consequence of a dispute between three peoples living there, as the aggressor has been trying to present to the world all this time. This is a classical aggression by three neighboring states—Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia—over territorial integrity, independence, and state sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was also confirmed by the international community.

The fact that the aggression was joined by the collaborators and members of the fifth column from the ranks of its own citizens, members of all three peoples, which were led by Karadzic, Boban, and Abdic, does not mean that the peoples were in the conflict themselves and that they should now seek reconciliation. With their thesis on

the conflict among the peoples, the authors of the convention for reconciliation, even though they did not intend it, are, objectively speaking, marginalizing the aggression and minimizing the responsibility for aggression.

If anyone should seek reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then it would make more sense that the Bosnian Serbs, who remained on the free territory and suffered the burden of the war together with the other two peoples, establish the conditions at their upcoming convention under which they would reconcile with their compatriots who, by joining the aggressor, fired at them and their children, held them under a siege without elementary conditions for living, tortured them with all kinds of blockades, and kept them under the psychological pressure of their propaganda machinery.

The same applies to the Bosnian Croats and their extremists, who worked against the interests of their people and their country, like the Bosnian Serb extremists did by taking part in the realization of the policy of territorial partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, trading with its territory, and the so-called human exchanges of their people, committing at the same time the crime of genocide against the other two nations through the so-called ethnic cleansing of their national territories.

Even after two years of human suffering, all types of fascism that emerged in this region are referred to in general terms, as if the term fascism could not be bear the name of the people who promoted it.

Therefore, the primary question today is not the reconciliation of these three peoples. They continued to live on the free territories, as was the case in the past. The primary question is under what conditions will the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats reconcile with their compatriots who were killing their children and destroying their houses and property.

The Bosnian Muslims have already taken their stand by directly confronting the supporters of [Fikret] Abdic, since all appeals to reason were understood as the weakness of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, instead of calling for a convention of reconciliation among the three peoples, it would be more sensible to ask one's own people on the occupied territories, as patriots of their homeland of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to turn their rifles against the fascist leaders and their followers, who have committed so many crimes against their own people.

Everyone must understand that, regardless of whether this convention of reconciliation was held, there will be no peace in Bosnian until the last refugee returns to his home, even if this home was burned down, and until the last criminal, regardless of his nationality, is punished for his crimes.

I would, therefore, recommend to those who proposed the convention and setting up of various commissions for building confidence among different peoples to keep clear of bad business, but to direct their political energy and influence in the people on the mobilization of people to stand against fascism and its executors in their own ranks.

Clinton himself recently said that Serbian fascism is the most responsible for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although one should not exonerate the Muslim and Croat fascists either. Our people do not need new illusions and political fog in the form of reconciliation conventions but an active struggle against fascism in one's own ranks.

Negotiations on Prisoner Exchange Begin

LD2203172494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Reporter Zdenko Vranjes reports on the talks on the status of Mostar and on the Croat-Muslim exchange of prisoners:

[Vranjes] In talks with Herceg-Bosna Prime Minister Jadranko Prlic, Minister Mile Akmadzic, and Mayor of Mostar Stojan Vrlic, members of the EU [European Union] delegation stressed they were satisfied with the evident readiness on both sides to approach the Washington agreement—regarding Mostar—sincerely and cooperatively. This will facilitate the task of the EU, which wishes, in an impartial way, to accelerate the normalization of life in Mostar, said Greek Ambassador Dimitros Rales, who leads the three-member EU delegation in its mission to investigate the situation on the ground before the EU begins the first steps to establish its administration.

The members of the EU delegation toured the east part of Mostar and held talks with the Muslim authorities. Croat representatives at the talks raised the issue of significant changes in the national composition of the population of Mostar, caused by the arrival from eastern Herzegovina of Muslim refugees and displaced persons, which, in the opinion of the Croat side, had been the cause of the months-long conflict. We guess that it will be important to agree who will return and who will stay and live in Mostar.

The second round of the prisoner exchange, agreed on in Uskopje between the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Bosnian Muslim side, took place today. The 251 prisoners released by the Croats from Rodoc, near Mostar, arrived in the eastern part of Mostar in zUNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] vehicles this afternoon. The Muslim side released six HVO members from Gornji Vakuf. Another 32 Croat prisoners released from Vares are expected to arrive in Kiseljak this afternoon, as well as 315 Croat civilians who took refuge at the UNPROFOR base in Carici near Kakanj during the Muslim offensive last year.

UN Official: Serbs Uncooperative

AU2303125994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Report by Zvonko Maric]

[Text] The past 20 days on the free territory of the Hadzici commune have passed in the spirit of the cease-fire, albeit burdened by numerous gatherings of the families of 189 missing persons, Bosniak Muslims from Hadzici. This prompted the commune authorities and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to intensify negotiations on the exchange of prisoners. Late last night a meeting took place between our negotiating team—Edo Godinjak, a representative of the republican Interior Ministry, Nedir Hadzic, the commander of the 9th Hill Brigade, and Brigadier Ajnadzic, who heads the team—and representatives of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] headed by Commander Santana.

At the very beginning of the meeting, Brigadier Ajnadzic made a goodwill gesture by offering several concessions to the aggressor side in order finally to deblock the process of exchanging prisoners from Silos for the 189 missing Hadzici citizens, which has generally been the toughest issue in the negotiations between [Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina Haris] Silajdzic and [Bosnian Serb official Momcilo] Krajisnik. It was agreed that today three prisoners from Silos prison would be exchanged for three prisoners from Kula. Four captured aggressor soldiers, which the prisoners in Silos elected themselves, were permitted to attend last night's meeting. Brigadier Ajnadzic proposed that a meeting be arranged on the free territory of the Hadzici commune between the representatives of four families of the captured aggressor soldiers with the families of the missing Hadzici citizens. Moreover, all the Serbian representatives will be allowed to visit the prisoners in Silos. It was also decided that from today [23 March], the prisoners from Silos would be allowed to establish telephone contact with [words indistinct] with families in Hadzici.

Mr. Santana expressed his gratitude for our delegation's concessions, and did not hide his dissatisfaction with the uncooperative attitude of the aggressor side, saying that he had the impression that it was not interested in the exchange, something that cannot be said for the family members of the Silos prisoners. Edo Godinjak, representative of the republican Interior Ministry, promised the UNPROFOR representatives that, in the course of the day, he would submit to them substantial documented video material that the republican Interior Ministry had obtained, which documents the ways, places, and those responsible for capturing the 189 Bosniak Muslim citizens of Hadzici. This material will help Captain Mason, who heads UNPROFOR's investigative team, locate the missing persons. According to Mr. Godinjak, Ratko Radic, Zoran Gasevic, Rade Veselinovic, Kiro Glagas, and Mladen Tolj participated in the capture of the missing persons. Commander of the 9th Hill Brigade Nedir Hadzic expressed his readiness to go ahead with an immediate exchange, but he stressed that the local authorities would not agree to any of the types of blackmail that the aggressor side has been using in prisoner exchange negotiations since the beginning of the war. The agreement will be implemented today, provided that the aggressor side decides to cooperate, of course.

Croats, RSK Serbs Begin Cease-Fire Talks

AU2203183294 Paris AFP in English 1755 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Zagreb, March 22 (AFP)—Croatian authorities and separatist Serbs began negotiating a ceasefire accord Tuesday [22 March] in hopes of building on a Moslem-Croat peace pact in neighboring Bosnia. The meeting at the Russian Embassy here, organised by Russia's special envoy to ex-Yugoslavia Vitaly Churkin in coordination with U.S. officials, is the first of its kind to be held in the Croatian capital under the auspices of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

The two sides last year held several similar meetings in Norway and Austria, with the Serbs demanding neutral territory for the talks. But those talks failed because of Serb insistence on autonomy for the Krajina region which they have proclaimed an independent republic. The separatist Serbs seized the Krajina region in the war that broke out between Croatia and the Yugoslav army when Zagreb declared independence from the old Serb-dominated Yugoslav federation in 1991.

John Mills, the spokesman for the international peace conference on former Yugoslavia, told journalists the discussions would focus on "a comprehensive ceasefire and separation of forces" of the two factions. The Krajina Serbs occupy a quarter of Croatian territory, and Mills acknowledged that separating the two forces was a "very difficult problem."

Shortly before the start of the talks, some 300 intellectuals gathered in the centre of the city to protest the start of dialogue with the separatists, whom they denounced as "war criminals." They accused Russia of making moves to "cement the Serb occupation" of Krajina, a UN-monitored area. Questioned on the demonstration, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who has ruled out any kind of "enlarged autonomy" for the separatists and is demanding the unconditional return of Krajina, told journalists that "not only Russian envoys but also those from the United States" had entered the talks with the "war criminals." He said the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, had joined the negotiations. Tudjman stressed the talks would continue for as long as was needed to reach a solution. "We are obliged to have discussions and we want to do so to ensure there are no more (war) victims. We will continue talking for as long as there is a chance" of a settlement, he said. Tudjman said he had received pledges of support for Zagreb's efforts to reassert its authority in Krajina from the United States and the UN Security Council, adding that this was an essential precondition should Croatia be forced into taking "extreme measures" in the event of the talks failing.

Tudjman last week asked the Security Council to authorise the use of force to disarm the rebels. He is insisting that the UN peacekeepers, whose mandate for operations in Croatia is up for renewal at the end of March, maintain strict control of a demarcation line.

Churkin has worked closely with his U.S. counterpart Charles Redman, who helped broker the Croat-Moslem agreement on a federation in Bosnia that was sealed in Washington on Friday [18 March].

Advisers Replace Defense Ministers

LD2203155094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1410 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Knin, 22 Mar (TANJUG)—Talks between the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) and Croatia began amid tight security in the Russian Embassy in Zagreb today, but the delegations are not being led by Defense Ministers Dusan Rakic and Gojko Susak, as was envisaged, the RSK Foreign Ministry has announced.

The delegations are being led by the national security advisers to the heads of state of the opposing sides—Generals Mile Novakovic and Hrvoje Sarinic—because the RSK delegation learned only on arrival at the Russian Embassy that the Croatian delegation would not be led by Defense Minister Susak, but by Sarinic.

In this situation the RSK delegation nominated General Novakovic as head of its delegation, and demanded that in the event of the signing of an agreement the person signing (for Croatia) should be Susak.

Vitaliy Churkin, the Russian deputy foreign minister, informed Krajina's delegation of this change just before the beginning of the negotiations. The RSK delegation told Churkin of its dissatisfaction at UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] action which prevented the arrival of Krajina journalists in Zagreb, but also because "it failed to keep its word regarding the composition of the Croatian delegation."

RSK Leader 'Not Satisfied'

LD2203194394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1904 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, 22 Mar (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], told Belgrade Radio's Channel One this afternoon that the Serb side is not satisfied with the course of today's negotiations in Zagreb and that the Croatian side is trying to impose a solution by threat.

Martic said the RSK delegation in Zagreb has informed him that the Croats are insisting on the disarming of the Serb forces, which the Serb side "certainly cannot accept." He added that the Serb delegation will stay at the talks despite this and will use all possibilities to establish peace.

The Serbs went to the talks with the objective of bringing the hostilities to an end and reaching an agreement on the RSK territories which are occupied by Croatia.

"Whatever the developments, we cannot go below our our minimum principle, the principle of self-determination. We have our parliament, our government, the president. They were legitimately elected in

the latest elections. Our people certainly cannot and will not allow our territory to be returned to Croatia," Martic said.

Bjegovic: Nothing Will Be Signed

AU2203183094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Our colleague Dragoljub Stankic reports on the reaction in Knin to the events in Zagreb:

[Begin recording] [Stankic] All information arriving via satellite links between the government seat here and the Russian Embassy in Zagreb are received with great attention here in Knin. So far, there have been few reports and all that we can say now is that the Krajina delegation landed at [Zagreb] Pleso airport aboard an UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] helicopter at 0930. With tight security measures, they arrived at the Russian Embassy at 1000. At the meeting with the Russian president's special envoy, Vitaliy Churkin, the head of the Krajina delegation expressed discontent with the composition of the Croat delegation. Namely, the Croatian side is not being led, as was agreed, by Gojko Susak, but by Hrvoje Sarinic.

While the first results of the negotiations are awaited, let us say that President Milan Martic is currently holding a meeting with his closest associates. We, however, have asked Djordje Bjegovic, chairman of the caretaker government, to say something more for Belgrade Radio about the draft agreement that is most probably being discussed in Zagreb. Is this a new agreement, or is it something that has now been seen for the first time in these regions?

[Bjegovic] First of all, I think that it is most important to say that the good thing is that peace is being discussed. Certainly that this first stage regarding the cease-fire and [word indistinct] signing such a document is the most important task, which should be regarded as a preliminary one. I think that what we may say in this situation is that there are no other agreements apart from corresponding modalities in a section of the line of separation. This part of the job should be documented with corresponding plans, that is, maps that would certainly verify this line of separation, so that one knows what we are talking about. The agreement, as a text, has never been a problem. The problem lay in the deployment of forces and certainly in the most important part of the job, the one that ensures peace, so that the artillery can finally be moved and thereby opportunities to shell one position from another are removed. I think that, in this situation, this is extremely difficult.

I think that the other aspect is most important. I think that, as the Croatian delegation has already changed its composition, it is impossible to expect anything to be signed in such a situation. The most important thing to say in the present situation is that our delegation is in Zagreb for the first time, and I think that, in this case—let us express it in a sportsman's way—we now have the white pieces [as in chess] and I am sure that this part of our cooperativeness will be (?appreciated) by the world.

[Stankic] One more question: The negotiations are being held in the Russian Embassy, at the Russian initiative, and with Vitaliy Churkin, special adviser to the Russian president, attending. What can you tell us about the Russian role in all this?

[Bjegovic] Well, you know, Russia [words indistinct] plays a relevant role. I think that at this moment, their role is much more specific than it was a year ago. The job that Russia wants to complete is exactly of the kind that we may expect, with a far greater level of security, to reach results, than was the case in the past. However, I can also say in this situation that this is not the time for us to be too optimistic. I would be happy if the Russian representatives would now exert their influence in an (?equality) way, that is, if they would exert their influence in the [word indistinct] stage, which now means the cessation of hostilities. Therefore, not partially, but (?completely).

[Stankic] Mr. Bjegovic, thank you for this conversation. We are going to report again when we have new information. [end recording]

Negotiations To Continue

AU2203220294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Interview with Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina, by Dragoljub Stankic in Knin on 22 March—recorded]

[Text] [Stankic] Could you give us the first comments on the negotiations in Zagreb so far?

[Martic] Well, we left for these negotiations with a clear aim. First of all, to establish a halt of [changes thought] to stop all hostilities, therefore, to establish peace, then to decide about the territory that has been temporarily occupied by Croatia in the January aggression in 1993 and in September. We also wanted to talk about the dumping of nuclear waste on the territory of western Slavonia, which is also occupied at the moment.

As things stand so far, I think that we cannot be satisfied as talks have taken another direction. Croatia obviously wants to impose itself on our delegation there with a degree of threat. It says that (?these are the stands) of both the United States and Russia, something that we do not believe. As our delegation in Zagreb reported to us, the Croatian delegation is now demanding that all our formations disarm themselves and the like. We certainly cannot accept that, but we will still remain at the negotiations to take advantage of all opportunities to reach peace.

[Stankic] What do you think about these demonstrations that are now held in front of the Russian Embassy in

Zagreb? We heard new reports: There are a lot of people there who are demonstrating.

[Martic] I consider that to be a method of pressure on our delegation so that, under this horrible pressure, they would give in and sign that paper. However, the people from our delegation are firm, stable, and know exactly to what limits they can go and why they have left. Nobody, including them, can sign something like that.

[Stankic] [words indistinct] all kinds of pressures on the Serb delegation and obviously this pressure on Serbs. It seems that this is how they would treat the Serbs in Croatia if they remained in a sort of autonomy.

[Martic] Well, you have both asked the question and provided the answer yourself.

[Stankic] Finally, let us say what your expectations are? How will these negotiations end?

[Martic] Well, I nevertheless expect Russian diplomacy to take more initiative here and to really comply to what it said when it invited us to go to the Zagreb negotiations and that is to establish all hostilities [as heard].

[Stankic] Let us return once again to the negotiations in Zagreb and the Serb side's platform. This is the problem of the occupied regions in Krajina and the problem of western Slavonia.

[Martic] As for the occupied territories, the answer is known. We have had agreements before, when Croatia signed that it would withdraw from the occupied territories, but they soon refuted all the agreements they signed and have not respected them.

[Stankic] How do you, Mr. President, see the final solution in these regions?

[Martic] I expect that, in future, we shall hold negotiations at the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. I expect us to find solutions there. However, whatever direction the situation may develop, we cannot go lower than our [word indistinct] and that is the people's right to self-determination. We have a parliament, a government, and a president and these are legally elected institutions [words indistinct]. We also have the people, who certainly will not and cannot allow our territory to be returned to Croatia. However, we shall allow this last referendum to be held before the international public—the people should express its own will about with whom it wants to live. We cannot withdraw from this principle of self-determination.

Participants 'Optimistic'

LD2303093494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0903 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Cease-fire negotiations between the Croatian Government and rebel Serb authorities in the protected areas are to resume on the 29th of this month. The talks were adjourned about 1230 last night, after 13 hours. The most difficult points were details of how to implement the cease-fire and to disengage forces on the ground.

According to HINA, all the participants were optimistic, and the Russian special envoy, Vitaliy Churkin, described the situation as favorable for reaching an agreement. The American ambassador stated that the countries involved in the talks firmly support Croatian integrity, but the problem must be solved by peaceful means. The leader of the Croatian delegation, Hrvoje Sarinic, said that the fact that the talks would resume next Tuesday spoke for itself. He added that he was optimistic about reaching a solution next week.

FRY Official Comments

LD2303132794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1253 GMT 23 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, March 23 (TANJUG)—Head of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) office in Zagreb Veljko Knezevic said it was a "political interest of the F.R.Y. to normalize relations with Croatia."

He told TANJUG Wednesday prior to leaving for Zagreb that people wished normalization of relations with all Yugoslavia's neighbors, especially with Croatia because the situation there was most complex. Knezevic stressed that Croatia behaved differently on the international scene as opposed to bilateral contacts.

The Yugoslav office in Zagreb was opened on the basis of an agreement the foreign ministers of F.R.Y. and Croatia signed on January 19 this year in Geneva. The office of Croatia in Belgrade was to be opened soon.

Speaking about the first round of talks between the Republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.) and Croatia in Zagreb on Tuesday, Knezevic said that normalization between Knin and Zagreb would surely contribute also to normalization of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb.

"It is very important that the talks are to be continued," assessed Knezevic and emphasized that "normalization and political solutions of problems between the R.S.K. and Croatia would be one of the decisive factors for pacifying the situation in the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia."

The problem of the R.S.K. was one of the pressing issues in settling of the Yugoslav crisis. The R.S.K. was proclaimed in 1991 in parts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia with predominantly Serb population in response to Croatia's forcible secession from the former Yugoslav Federation and reducing the status of the Serb people from a constituent people to one of a national minority in the new state.

The subsequent armed clashes between the R.S.K. Serbs and the Zagreb authorities, which do not recognize the R.S.K., resulted in a decision to declare the R.S.K. a

U.N.-Protected Area (UNPA) in the spring of 1992 until a political settlement was reached.

Tudjman News Conference on U.S. Visit, RSK

LD2203142494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 22 Mar 94

[News conference by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman with domestic and foreign correspondents in Zagreb—live]

[Text] [Tudjman] On return from our visit to the United States and the United Nations, I can say that Croatia—and I, personally—can be more than satisfied with the results of the talks that I had with the most senior statesmen of the United States—President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and Secretary of State Christopher. Members of the Croatian delegation—[Mate] Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, [Defense] Minister [Gojko] Susak, Minister (Jeren), Minister Jasic, and Vice Governor Rogic—also had talks with their counterparts and, as a whole, the talks with the highest-ranking representatives of the U.S. Government were fruitful and signified the creation of a basis for lasting, friendly cooperation between Croatia and the United States and for a partnership with the United States.

I believe that you must know a great deal by now about the agreements that we have signed, the agreements on a Croat-Bosnian Muslim federation and the confederation of a federal Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. This event was described not only by our hosts but also by international diplomatic circles and the United Nations as an event of historical significance, as a watershed in the efforts to resolve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and as a resolute step toward peace.

The talks I had at the United Nations with Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali and all his aides and, in particular, my speech in the Security Council—which met with Madame Albright, the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations in the chair—were for us of great significance. During the course of these talks with both the UN secretary general and his aides and, in particular, in the Security Council, it became evident that Croatia's stands were enjoying support from almost all the Security Council members—Argentina, Brazil, New Zealand, Great Britain, Russia, the Czech Republic, and so forth. Like U.S. statesmen and all those we talked to, they also paid tribute to Croatia and its steadfast, determined, and sensible policy and reiterated their support for Croatia's territorial integrity. Both President Clinton and the Security Council members stated emphatically that, for their part, they would do their utmost to ensure that the UN Security Council resolutions were implemented and that the Croatian territories under the control of the peace forces and under Serb occupation—and it was the first time that U.S. representatives and the Security Council spoke in those terms—were reintegrated in Croatia's constitutional and legal system as soon as possible.

Understandably, during the course of this, everyone was appealing for this to be done peacefully while, on their part, they will bring pressure to bear—by way of sanctions and in other ways—on Serbia and Yugoslavia so that they renounce occupation and accept a solution. During the course of these talks on the new mandate, I presented Croatia's views that we could accept, that we accepted, the extension of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate on the condition that some guidelines for the implementation of the Vance plan and UN Security Council resolutions were laid down.

In this context, I drew attention to the importance of the implementation of Resolution 769 on border controls between Croatia and Serbia and between Croatia and those areas in Bosnia that are under the control of Serb forces and to the disarmament of Serb paramilitary formations. Without this, there can be no peace. I also drew attention to the beginning of the return of refugees and, lastly, the gradual restoration of infrastructure facilities, communications, oil pipelines, and power lines.

In this context, we were met with understanding, so we can expect the UN Security Council to pass resolutions to this effect. They understandably may be gradual. Perhaps they may not include everything at once. It is essential, though, that we have a political climate today in which there is full understanding for Croatia's views. All in all, this visit has consolidated and reinforced Croatia's international position—both by way of our alliance, our partnership with the United States in its capacity as the superpower that plays the main role in modern international developments, and within the framework of the United Nations.

I would like to stress, in particular, another important event—the opening of the Croatian Embassy in Washington and my meeting with Croatian emigres—those emigres who made it possible with their hands, their financial contributions, and also with their work—for us to have one of the most beautiful buildings, one of the most beautiful embassies you can find there. Many people worked there. They came from distant parts of the United States—from New York, Cleveland, from other parts. They travelled for long hours and worked all day throughout their weekends so we would get a building that can make us proud indeed—we as the Croatian state, the Croatian people in the United States.

This was a touching meeting with our people, both in our embassy and particularly later on at the opening ceremony at the embassy, which was attended by about 1,000 people. Some of our ministers could not get in because they arrived late.

All in all, this is yet further proof of the unity of the homeland with emigrants from Croatia. The embassy was purchased by us in the homeland, but both money and work have been contributed by our emigrants. This is evidence both of the unity of the homeland and of

emigrants from Croatia and of the pride of our Croatian people in being able to do something for their free, democratic Croatia.

It was really nice to be in Washington and New York and return to the homeland with the feeling that we have strengthened the international position of Croatia and that the problems facing us can now be resolved more successfully, with fewer difficulties, and in a more resolute and rapid way.

That is enough by way of an introduction.

[Unidentified correspondent] [words indistinct] of Deutsche Welle. Mr. President, every time the UNPROFOR mandate expires, local rebel Serbs are ready for talks and agreements. It has been demonstrated that nothing has come of these agreements so far, and this time their representatives will come to Zagreb when the UNPROFOR mandate expires. Do you bring with you—after your trip to Washington and meeting with Butrus-Ghali—any guarantees that things will be different this time? What would be the very latest deadline for refugees to return to their homes?

[Tudjman] Clearly, the current talks are taking place in different circumstances, in altered conditions with regard to the efforts to resolve the crisis in former Yugoslavia as a whole, in Bosnia, and—by implication—in Croatia. The guarantees you mentioned lie in the fact that top U.S. statesmen and—as I said before—those in the United Nations, have stated emphatically that they will support efforts to reintegrate the Croatian territories now under Serb occupation into our constitutional and legal system as soon as possible.

Just like us, the world also wants this problem to be resolved in a peaceful way. That it would be better to resolve it in a peaceful way was made clear to us in Washington during a meeting with a group of Croatian people. There I met a man, a young man, with no arms—I shall do everything to make sure that there are fewer of these victims. But, understandably, the opponent will soon realize that we are prepared to use all means available if we fail [to reduce the number of victims]."

As for the return of the refugees, we would like this to happen instantly. I told the Security Council that we could not accept the proposal to extend the mandate for another year, another 12 months, but that we could accept it only for another six months—provided that the refugees be allowed to start returning to their homes during that time.

This, of course, is a complicated process; however, with the support that we have in the world currently, I think we will be able to initiate and finalize it in a way that suits our people. This is not just an issue of Croatia's sovereignty and its territorial integrity, but it also reflects the justified desire of our refugees. They must begin preparing for it. Although we will try and avoid unwise steps, it is justified to expect the refugees to begin preparations to return and to let the world know that this is what they insist on and that it cannot be denied them—that it is a justified demand that must be met soon.

[al-Isa] Mr. President. Nada al-Isa, Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and TV and the state agency Bosnia Press. When are you going to visit Sarajevo? Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Izetbegovic said at a news conference yesterday that he had invited you. I would like to know whether you intend to accept the invitation and visit Sarajevo? Has world diplomacy—or Croatian and Bosnian diplomacy—performed a miracle? Rumor has it that Parliament Speaker Mesic was advised roughly two months ago not to pay a return visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly President Miro Lazovic.

[Tudjman] First of all, who did advise him? One should not enshroud this question in any kind of politicking. I have accepted Mr. Alija Izetbegovic's invitation, and I would like to visit Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina very soon.

[Perasovic] Zeljko Perasovic, GLAS SLAVONIJE. Mr. President, when will the normalization of relations with the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia take place? Or in other words, why has Veljko Knezevic [Serbian ambassador to Zagreb] not come to Zagreb yet? Do you have any information about this?

[Tudjman] Yugoslavia's representative, Knezevic, has already been in Zagreb. Whether or not he has come back, I do not know. The process of normalization was initiated by the opening of representative offices. It will probably continue despite those who would like to thwart this normalization. There are, understandably, unreasonable people everywhere. I believe that the Croatian- Bosniak-Muslim agreement on creating a Croatian-Bosniak-Muslim federation and a confederation of a federal Bosnia with Croatia must have a positive influence on the Serbs, to the effect that they accept normalization, that they realize that if they do not accept it, that would be even more detrimental to them.

Consequently, despite everything that stands in the way of this normalization, I believe that normalization will nevertheless take place. There will, of course, be difficulties.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, do you anticipate the possibility of a peace agreement in the talks today with local Serbs in the Russian Embassy?

[Tudjman] I do not understand. An agreement?

[Unidentified correspondent] Do you anticipate the possibility of an agreement with local Serbs in the negotiations in the Russian Embassy today? Is there the possibility of an agreement with the local Serbs in the negotiations?

[Tudjman] I have already answered that question. Regardless of the fact that there will be haggling and

difficulties, I believe that neither the local Serbs nor Belgrade have any option but to accept the road to normalization.

[Saracevic] Saracevic, German radio. Mr. President, according to the Croatian press, you said in an interview you gave to Reuters TV that Bosnian Serbs would be given the possibility of forming a confederation with Serbia if they were to enter the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation—if they join it. Were you given any indications to make this assumption? Does this mean that the state, or rather the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, would be part of two confederations—of the Croat-Bosnian confederation with Croatia and Bosnian-Serb confederation with Serbia—if this does happen? Is this not slightly illogical, or does this mean the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state?

I am asking if this—and this is connected with the so-called Krajinas here in Croatia—would this mean changes in the borders? If this is the case, it would, in my view, threaten Croatia's borders as well. Can you elaborate? Thank you.

[Tudjman] First, the two issues—the resolution of the Bosnian issue and of the Croatian territories under the control of the peace forces and under Serb occupation—have nothing in common in that the question of whether Bosnia-Herzegovina is resolved on a confederal or federal basis has no effect on how the issue of the Croatian territories is resolved.

Three constituent nations are at issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Serb ethnic community in Croatia is a minority that is not entitled to the right to self-determination under any international conventions, regulations, or common law. These areas have always been part of Croatia and never part of Yugoslavia or Serbia. In other words, there is no need to link this issue, except in that it will also be affected by the military and political resolution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia. It will not, however, be affected in the sense that any potential changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina will inevitably imply similar changes in Croatia.

I do not know what it is that you read and Reuters wrote but, in any case, I did not say that the situation could develop in such a way that the Serbs would be allowed to join a Bosniak Muslim-Croat federation and to set up a confederation with Serbia—or rather Yugoslavia—at the same time. On the contrary, I said that something of that kind was inconceivable, but that at some stage it could happen that the events unfold in the future in such a way that the part of the territory declared a so-called Srpska republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina—in other words, the part of the territory under Serb control—will be allowed to set up a confederation with Serbia, or rather Yugoslavia, and the Bosniak Muslim-Croat part with Croatia. In other words, this is not the case of a double or simultaneous confederation.

Then there are speculations that, in some way, all this is an attempt to restore Yugoslavia. This is out of the question. There can be no solutions that are unacceptable to either the Croatian people in Bosnia or to the Croatian state.

[Unidentified correspondent] Even well-intentioned friends abroad have been harboring suspicions regarding the implementation of this agreement signed in Washington, particularly because no time frame has been laid down for this transitional period. What is your view of the possibility of problems arising during the course of implementing this agreement? Do you know, or can you tell us in more detail, how long this transitional period will be?

[Tudjman] Please tell us on whose behalf you are asking. Please always say who you represent.

[Unidentified correspondent] I am a representative of the KUNA news agency of Kuwait.

[Tudjman] I do not know what kind of speculation you are talking about. A transitional period is inevitable at any rate. How long it will be depends, understandably, on all kinds of things, so it is hard to predict anything. By all means, both our Western allies and ourselves will strive to make this period as short as possible.

[Curic] Jozo Curic, Croatian TV. Mr. President, we have started talking about what follows next in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you tell us now about the military agreements that have been signed and about your reports on the situation on the ground? What is your view of further developments on the ground? Are we waiting for the Serbs to decide or not, or else can the Croats and Muslims already do something by themselves?

[Tudjman] As you can see, the Croats and Muslims are already working on their own. The world finds it surprising that the cease-fire between the Muslims and Croats has taken effect, that there is no longer any warfare, that they are exchanging prisoners. Even we ourselves can be satisfied in a positive sense and accept these developments. Consequently, the consolidation of Croat-Muslim relations is underway. What lies ahead for them as well as for international factors is to persuade the Serbs to accept a solution that would also bring about an end to the war and a political solution.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, Beic, Croatian Radio. As far as your visit to the UN headquarters, and particularly your presence at the session of the UN Security Council, is concerned, you pointed out on behalf of Croatia several essential elements for the continuation of UNPROFOR's mandate. One of these essential elements is the deployment of UNPROFOR troops along Croatia's internationally recognized borders. I would like to know what the UN Security Council's answer is, particularly regarding the future mandate and the next term. How does the UN Security Council view this proposition of yours? Thank you.

[Tudjman] I first made this demand in talks with the UN secretary general and his aides; they showed understanding and promised to review this demand, likewise the Security Council. Naturally, this demand includes authorizations to UNPROFOR in order for them to implement it. On my part, I voiced the opinion that there was no need to boost UNPROFOR's numerical strength but that its activities should be redirected towards controlling points that can be controlled, that is, the border between Croatia and Serbia on the Danube and in eastern Slavonia, in Srijem and along the border with Bosnia. I also pointed out that NATO's air support ought to be forthcoming if these forces are threatened or prevented from controlling these borders. This will be examined and the Security Council will decide on the new mandate.

As we now have a favorable political climate, this is of great importance for resolving not only the UN-protected areas but the crisis in former Yugoslavia as a whole, and we expect the Security Council to be responsive in determining the new mandate and to take steps that would empower UNPROFOR to implement the Vance plan and all Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 769 concerning border control, and 871 which is all-encompassing.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, Mate [name indistinct] of VECERNJI LIST. Reporting on the meeting at the Russian Embassy in Zagreb, Belgrade Radio said this morning that the Western powers have agreed in principle that Baranja should be given to Serbia in exchange for Krajina and peace. What could you tell us about this?

[Tudjman, laughing] Agreement in principle, whose agreement in principle? Well, you know that people sometimes tend to make plans without consulting those concerned, in any case, even dreaming that we might agree to such negotiations is out of the question. As far as the talks at the Russian Embassy go, in addition to Russian representatives I believe that U.S. representatives will also be taking part, at my proposal.

[Unidentified correspondent] [name indistinct] of VJESNIK. Mr. President, has there been any mention in the Pentagon about Croatia's joining NATO, and will Croatia be granting NATO certain locations—Vis and Lastovo, for instance—for use as military bases?

[Tudjman] Good God, would you like to discuss military secrets here? [laughs] Understandably, the talks centered on all issues of interest to Croatia and of interest to our collocutors. Croatia will receive support for access to the Partnership for Peace, while all the rest is a question of mutual interest and, as I said—military secrets—but what is important is this: Croatia needs allies and we have found them, we have them. And Croatia, as it is, is of interest to the most important international factors, including the United States. This is what we are basing our policy on. This is exactly what we have achieved with our consistent policy—we now have allies and these allies need Croatia, they count on it. They count on it not only in the quest for peace but also in the establishment of the new international order in the region of former Yugoslavia and in southeast Europe.

[Ramljak] Olga Ramljak, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. At the beginning you mentioned unity between the Croatian homeland and the diaspora. In the meantime, while the agreements were being signed in Washington, the media reported on demands from the top state and party level for the resignation of Defense Minister Gojko Susak because he allegedly disagrees with this policy, or else because there is suspicion that he will not implement it correctly. Today, we have a civil initiative, a public protest following the arrival of Serb negotiators in Zagreb, under the slogan: We do not want to negotiate with war criminals. What is your comment on these cases in view of your statement that we will now be resolving our problems quicker and more resolutely?

[Tudjman] We have thus seized opportunities to resolve them quicker and more resolutely [as heard]. The demands that Minister Susak should be sacked did not come from the top state level but from individuals, from politicking schemers. These demands will be subject to political assessments and, understandably, they will not change the state policy. Being at the helm of such an important ministry, Minister Susak had my full trust. Not only did he enjoy trust in his leadership of the Defense Ministry but also amid Croatia's precarious position when we had to extend our support to the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, first against the Serb aggressor so we could secure the survival of people there [sentence as heard].

Consequently, these demands can be raised by those who disagreed with this policy or those who are doing this for personal reasons. Not only are there always politicking schemers in politics but there are also people who have different views on some individual issues or different demands. Everything, however, eventually fits in its place.

As regards the protest you mentioned, I do not know about it. I can imagine there are such people. One should not talk to war criminals provided they were not there, or if we could bring them to justice or send them to the moon, so they would not exist [as heard]. Even representatives of the European Union [EU], official representatives of the EU and official representatives of the largest European powers, and even the main superpower, the United States, negotiate with them.

Mr. Redman, President Clinton's personal special envoy, visited not only Zagreb but Belgrade too. It is not only representatives of Russia who talk to them but those of the United States and Europe, too. Consequently, we too are forced to talk. Moreover, we are willing to talk so as not to suffer further casualties. It is easy to be bellicose and say—no talks. Let those people identify themselves so they can see, even before I started my journey there were 11 fatalities and some 30 wounded in one of

Croatia's battlefields. We are not going to play either with human lives or with Croatia's interests because of someone's insanity.

I understand the rage of our people, as I share it too. But policies are governed by reason as well as by heart. Understandably, this is always the case, in history and at the end of all wars and during wars, one talks to one's opponents. We are in conflict with them and we should get out of this. Consequently, this is not simply some kind of will of ours or our weakness but, if you will, our strength as well, as a result or consequence of the overall international circumstances in the period from the collapse of Yugoslavia to this crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, understandably, the problem of Croatia's areas under Serb occupation and UNPROFOR protection [sentence as heard].

So, we will continue talking for as long as there is any chance. We have stressed and continue to stress that we have not given up the ultimate means if the talks fail. But then we have to have the support, to secure the support of the international circles and forces which are active in international organizations and have a decisive role in creating current international order.

[Skugor-Hrncevic] Smiljana Skugor-Hrncevic, HINA. Mr. President, during your visit to Washington another agreement was signed which was overshadowed by the political agreements. This is an agreement between Croatia and the United States on scientific and technical cooperation. Can you tell us a bit more about this agreement? Are there any concrete indications regarding aid and cooperation?

[Tudjman] The agreement on scientific and technical cooperation is one of the most important agreements. The amount available for Fulbright scholarships has already been doubled. Work is being done to extend cooperation into other fields. This is one of the agreements to be signed in various other fields [as heard].

[Unidentified correspondent] [name indistinct] DANAS. Mr. President, it is being rumored that some government ministers will be replaced. Is it only a government reshuffle or is Premier Valentic to leave? Can you say something about this?

[Tudjman] There will be no government reshuffle.

Greek 'Sources' Report U.S. Military Preparations

LD2203141794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1340 GMT 22 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, March 22 (TANJUG)—Greece is in possession of information that the United States is preparing to open military bases in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (F.Y.R.M.) and hastily building bases in Albania, as part of preparations for possible NATO operations against Serbia, the Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI writes on Tuesday, citing Greek sources.

The United States is hastily building its military bases and adapting airports near the ports of Valona and Durazzo in Albania, which is a part of the U.S. plan to form its militacy satellites in this region. The second part of the U.S. plan is to form military bases in the F.Y.R.M., Yorgos Harvalias, editor of the Greek pro-government paper ELEFTHEROS TYPOS says.

Harvalias claims that Americans have sent logistics experts to the F.Y.R.M. to restore a former Yugoslav Army base at Krivolak so its could accommodate some 5,000 troops.

The Americans need bases in Albania and in the F.Y.R.M. if they engage in fighting Serbia as NATO operations require two fronts. The mountainous region between Albania and the Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija does not permit of waging a war with infantry but from the F.Y.R.M. territory it would be much easier because second front is opened in this way, Harvalias stresses.

Albanian separatists in Kosovo and Metohija have attempted for decades to secede this Serbian province from the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and joint it to neighbouring Albania. To achieve this aim, they are using conventional terrorist methods, launching attacks on members of the army and police.

Over the past year, provocations on the Yugoslav-Albanian border and illegal incursions into the territory of the F.R.Y. are frequent.

The Krivolak testing range is the best equipped military testing ground in Europe and the former Yugoslav Army invested enormous funds in it, Radovan Kecojevic, the foremost Yugoslav military expert for explosive devices and pyrotechnics, whose knowledge and innovations are appreciated around the world, says.

The configuration of Krivolak's terrain is such that a 1-kilo watt nuclear bomb can explode on it with no adverse effects for the environment, Kecojevic told VECERNJE NOVOSTI on Tuesday.

A total of 322 U.S. troops, as part of the U.N. peacekeepers, are currently in the F.Y.R.M., and a possibility of bringing in additional troops is considered so that the Scandinavian peacekeeping contingent, currently in the F.Y.R.M., could be re-deployed in Bosnia.

Soros Gives $4 Million for Embargo Losses

AU2303123294 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 23 Mar 94

[Unattributed report: "Gligorov and Soros Held Press Conference"]

[Text] The American businessman and founder of the Open Society Fund George Soros arrived in Skopje yesterday, as announced. He emphasised his 4 million dollars aid for Macedonia is aimed to alleviate losses resulting from the Greek embargo. Mr. Soros met with top-level politicians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and with parliament groups' representatives. Yesterday afternoon he had a meeting with President Gligorov, followed by a joint press-conference. President Gligorov underlines Mr. Soros' contribution and his readiness to help at these difficult times in Macedonia. We have very useful discussions, Gligorov said, primarily on the embargo and possible ways to endure it, as well as on the media in Macedonia, possibilities on more frequent programs on minority languages, etc.

Soros condemned the embargo in front of the press, warning against a possible wider conflict in the region to involve neighbouring countries, unless the embargo is lifted. Those are the reasons, he explained, Macedonia presently needs economic aid to survive.

Asked by Greek paper "Elefterothipia" whether he would send a letter to UN mediator Cyrus Vance in the same way Athens did, President Gligorov answered positively. Mr. Soros stated he had not had an did not plan any contacts with the Greek government at present.

Federal

Economic Cost of UN Sanctions Viewed

LD2203203594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2016 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 22 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) has lost 45.117 billion dollars through the disintegration of the former federation and draconic sanctions subsequently clamped on the country by the United Nations, show figures released on Tuesday by the Yugoslav Science and Development Ministry's development and economic policy centre.

The U.N. Security Council imposed comrehensive and mandatory sanctions on Yugoslavia in May 1992 for the country's alleged involvement in civil war raging among the local Moslems, Serbs and Croats in the neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Of the 45.117 billion dollars, the loss to the national product accounted for 38.136 billion dollars, lost net earnings from the abroad for 1.415 billion, lay-over compensation for 436 million, and humanitarian and economic assistance to the refugees and the Serb states in the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, for a further 5.130 billion dollars, the centre's officials said at a press conference.

The figure does not include losses incurred through a halted scientific and technological development and a brain-drain, explained the centre's director Misa Jandric, assistant minister for science and development.

Furthermore, incalculable damage has been done to Yugoslavia's reputation in the world and in international fora and to the health, education and culture of the population, which have been brought down to an alarmingly low level, said Jandric.

Should the sanctions remain in place, Yugoslavia stands to lose 147.33 billion dollars by the year 2011, the centre estimates.

A study prepared by the centre indicates that Yugoslavia cannot hope to regain the level of economic activity recorded in 1990 before the year 2012, which brings with itself the threat of a slowed development of its neighbors and of Europe as a whole.

In 1990, Yugoslavia's gross national product stood at 26.6 billion dollars, to dwindle down to barely 12.57 billion dollars in 1993.

Jovanovic 'Suspicious' About U.S. Objectives

BR2303135994 Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 23 Mar 94 p 5

[Interview with FRY Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Christophe Lamfalussy in Brussels on 22 March: "The European Union Must Keep Its Promises"]

[Text] [Lamfalussy] Minister, you are going to meet with Andre Adam, director general of policy at the Foreign Ministry. What is the nature of your visit?

[Jovanovic] So many things worry us: The Yugoslav crisis, the unjust and artificial isolation in which we have been placed.

[Lamfalussy] In practice, you want the sanctions to be lifted?

[Jovanovic] The European Union (EU) must keep its promises. It was it which proposed the peace plan to us. It asked the Serbian side to fulfill the conditions. And they have been fulfilled. It promised us that it would start to lift the sanctions. And we have been waiting for several months. Hoping that its promise means something. If not, its credibility in the negotiations will be greatly affected.

[Lamfalussy] There is still an impression that Serbian Bosnia and Serbia are the same...

[Jovanovic] Our influence on the Bosnian Serbs has limits. When three of our presidents went from Belgrade to Pale last year, they were humiliated. Their prestige suffered as a result. The Bosnian Serbs have been living there for a thousand years. They know their rights better than us. If they feel that we do not support them, they are ready to tell us to go to the devil.

[Lamfalussy] What is your influence on the Serbs in Krajina who are opening negotiations with the Croatian Government this Tuesday?

[Jovanovic] We cannot tell them what agreement they must sign. We can tell them that the hostilities must end, which is what we are saying to the Croatians too.

[Lamfalussy] What is your feeling?

[Jovanovic] We must return to the self-determination which was guaranteed by the last federal constitution of Yugoslavia and the penultimate Croatian Constitution. Croatia was defined as the state of the Croatian nation and the Serbian nation. When Mr. Tudjman came to power, his first action was to revise the constitution and reduce the Serbs to a minority. Until their rights are restored, there will not be much room for a compromise.

[Lamfalussy] In one country which would be Croatia?

[Jovanovic] It is possible if they reach agreement.

[Lamfalussy] Is the agreement signed in Washington by Croatians and Muslims another sign of hope?

[Jovanovic] God willing. It may be a hope, but it may also be dangerous. It will all depend on the American vision. Do they want a just and lasting peace? Or do they want to humiliate the Serbs?

[Lamfalussy] Mr. Redman has visited Belgrade...

[Jovanovic] He only gave broad outlines. The Americans are not telling us openly what they want. That makes us suspicious.

[Lamfalussy] One guarantee for peace is the control which you have over the war criminals, Arkan for instance...

[Jovanovic] Arkan only carried out one escapade in two years without our knowing about it. He was invited by the mayor of Bijeljina [as published] who wanted to oppose a mini-coup d'etat by the Muslims. We have never accepted the atrocities committed by him or by other parties. But in a civil war, there is no room for angels.

Commentary Notes Skepticism Over Military Budget

AU2303092594 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Mar 94

[Commentary by Dara Vucinic: "Patriotism in the Budget"]

[Text] We have always known this: The people can go without, the army cannot. Patriotism, therefore, is measured by expenditure on the military budget. That is why recently in the Yugoslav assembly, not only the Socialists but also experts and politicians from the Democratic Party stated decisively: We shall vote for this proposal for the federal budget only because it is a military one. Fair enough! Things are what they are. Of the planned 1,674 million dinars, 1,264 million dinars, or 75.5 percent, of the budget has been allocated to military requirements. That is the way to go: Our army—is that not so?—has always been the surest guarantee for the maintenance of our homeland and its (unknown) borders.

However, a few days ago the owner of a private business spoke out, saying that he was no less patriotic than those who proposed the federal budget, but since he was personally contributing a sizable amount to the military budget, he would like to know "what the people will be getting out of the 100,000 soldiers and 100,000 policemen?" After all, the citizens must get something in return, perhaps beatings and more beatings.... Because, God forbid that the authorities could be thinking that it is in the interest of the taxpayers to fill the coffers of the army and the police to the maximum, while at the same time making only minor contributions to the coffers allocated to diplomatic activity, to which the government allocated precisely 39 million dinars. Really. Will it be the generals or the diplomats who will pull us out of the crisis? Taxpayers, particularly owners of private businesses, have begun to ask this out loud. Perhaps in vain. Because this is not the United States, where people pay taxes, but under the motto: "No taxation without representation!"

Serbia

UN Report on War Crimes Viewed

LD2203151194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1429 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 22 (TANJUG)—According to data of the U.N. War Crimes Commission, at least 55,000 war crimes have been committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, TANJUG has learnt at the Information Center of the Serbian Council (ICSC) on Tuesday. Most of these crimes were committed against Serb civilians in Croatia, the ICSC said.

It is estimated that a lot more crimes have in fact been committed because, according to a statement of Chairman of the U.N. War Crimes Commission Cherif Bassiouni, not all rapes have been reported nor have all mass graves been investigated.

Many crimes are still undiscovered, especially in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where fierce Moslem-Croat clashes have been underway for already a year and the conflicting sides have been accussing each other of intentional destruction of settlements, massacres of civilians and torture of prisoners.

The commission of U.N. experts for war crimes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, set up two years ago on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 780, has not managed to carry out the expected investigation but has only managed to gather documentation.

As the commission's mandate expires on April 30, it will not [words indistinct] in eastern Slavonia, on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina, which has been planned for April 10.

The RSK was proclaimed in 1991 in Serb ancestral lands in the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia in response to Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslav Federation and its attempt to downgrade the Serbs to a national minority.

On March 20, Croatia sent a protest letter to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali claiming that the commission was "discontinuing work" and that this was "sabotage against the investigation on the principal war criminals," a description reserved by the Croatian propaganda for Serbs.

Zagreb had intentionally falsified facts because, above all, the commision was not discontinuing work but its mandate was expiring and thus the task it was entrusted to do was being wrapped up regardless of the fact commission had carried it out.

Besides, due to financial and technical reasons the commission postponed the beginning of the investigation. Croatia thus gained time and with the expiration of the commission's mandate, managed to avoid an international inquiry into the deaths of the victims buried on its territory.

"We have reliably established that there are 87 graves where murdered Serbs have been buried in Croatia," an ICSC official Vojin Dabic told TANJUG and added that the Serb side had undisputable evidence for this. This evidence was recognized zy the commission's secretary Julio Baez, during his visit on March 10, he said.

Dabic added that the ICSC has reliable information that Croats have ploughed over some graves on their territory, such as the one in Pakracka Poljana in western Slavonia, ahead of the arrival of U.N. commission experts, in order to hide traces of the crime. That is precisely why we have to find out where the remains of the Serb victims have been moved, he said.

Commentary on U.S.-German 'Rivalry' in NATO

AU2203143694 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Mar 94 p 13

[Commentary by Milan Mijalkovski: "Partnership for Discord"]

[Text] The United Nations is generally seen as the most significant international organization in charge of the preservation of peace and security in the world. Since the two world wars started in Europe, and the Cold War between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was most palpable in Europe, in 1973 the CSCE was founded in Helsinki to prevent possible cataclysms. Ever since, the CSCE member-countries (the European countries, the United States, and Canada) have been working systematically to strengthen mutual trust by solving problems in three domains (security, economics, and humanitarian aid). Without diminishing the importance of the last two, security is still the most important, because it clearly puts member-countries under an obligation to observe the established principles with regard to international affairs, particularly in terms of supplying information and making it possible to view the condition and activities of their armed forces. Intense negotiations on disarmament were crowned by the Vienna Document in 1990, by which Soviet military dominance (and power) in Europe was eliminated. Before that, at the CSCE meeting in Paris (from 19 to 21 March 1990) the Charter for a New Europe was adopted, which announces the cessation of the Cold War and presents the conceptual arrangement of future relations in Europe. The violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia and a war whose end is still not in sight best show to what extent the CSCE member-countries have stuck to the Charter (it does not anticipate the possibility of war breaking out).

The dynamics and character of the political and military processes in Europe in the course of 1990 created the illusion that finally a time of peace and well-being had come about. However, some significant facts were overlooked, which warned of the evidently misjudged situation. The facts are: Nobody mentioned that NATO should be dissolved, although there was no more need for its existence; NATO was rejoicing over victory against its main opponent, that is, the Warsaw Pact, and ignoring the warning of a USSR official that something horrible would come about with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact—NATO would remain without an enemy; the Warsaw Pact member-countries naively believed that they would be swamped with the capital of the rich West; German unification was underestimated, while some vital goals and interests of Russia were disregarded.

Therefore, inexplicably, the role of the CSCE since 1990 has been pushed into the background. There is a good chance that NATO might take up the role of the CSCE, because the steps that are being taken these days point to that possibility quite clearly. Of course, that possibility has primarily to do with the expansion of NATO, which is the plan that NATO is trying to camouflage with the "Partnership for Peace" project. Many facts indicate that it will be a cause of more discord in Europe rather than peace.

The essence is in the following: NATO was formed to keep the Russians out of, the Americans in, and the Germans subdued in Europe. The first task has been accomplished, but the second and the third are still facing many difficulties, the cause of which is to be found in the smoldering rivalry between the former boss, NATO (or rather the United States), and the new rival, Germany. These two, guided by the knowledge that the open rivalry between them at an inconvenient moment might have a negative effect on NATO's cohesion, have opted for a detour, which is to say, they are trying to preserve the Alliance (the United States), and to ascend to a dominant position (Germany) at the expense of the Eastern European countries, and in such a way to postpone the moment of direct confrontation. Consequently, under the pretext that NATO wants to help its former enemies, the United States and Germany have started a massive humanitarian mission in the East, of course only to accomplish their own goals and interests. Even this covert conflict may have a certain negative impact on NATO's cohesion. However, there is no doubt that the Eastern European peoples will be the ones who will eventually suffer and pay the highest price.

And what has actually happened? Just as in the past, the aggressive Germans have shown their proneness to hasty actions. By putting pressure on the European Community and the United States to recognize unconditionally the forceful secession of Slovenia, Croatia, and thereafter the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany scored the first points among the allies. Of course, with that Germany only announced its global aspirations. They became evident in 1993, when Germany signed agreements on military cooperation with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the former Soviet Baltic republics.

The fact that German military circles make decisions on all the important questions regarding the system of defense and the armed forces of the Czech Republic is a reliable indicator of what kind of agreements that it is all

about (partnership should mean reciprocity). Such colonial-like successes of Germany in the East have caused skepticism on the part of the United States, while patriotic forces in Russia have felt that as a direct offense.

A reaction ensued in a flash. The United States decided to legalize their colonial interests in some former socialist countries by launching the Partnership for Peace project, in which all the NATO member-countries are supposed to take part, and to act as a monolith, while it is well known that in Albania it is solely the U.S. advisers who have been placed at all levels of the Albanian state administration, and that important political decisions must not be made without their approval.

It is naive to think, let alone believe, that the United States and Germany can accept former socialist countries as equal partners in decision-making, be it with regard to military issues, or any other issues. The attitude that the partners will have a right to consult with NATO on whether there is a direct or indirect danger to their security shows more than clearly that the Partnership has nothing to do with partnership, but rather with the typical U.S. patronage toward former enemies. Moreover, how NATO assesses whether the security of their partners is endangered, and to what extent, can be seen in the following: The fact that every fourth Russian voter voted for Zhirinovsky, while every seventh voted for the Communist Party, is reportedly a very great danger that threatens Russia. However, despite this and other alarming facts, the former Warsaw Pact member-countries (in the so-called neuralgic zone) are still naively hoping that the NATO countries (the zone of prosperity) will accept them as equal partners and make fair plans for their future.

The implementation of this project, which was started without a clear vision of what the future European defense system should be like, will probably exact a very high price. Who will pay that price is hard to say at this moment. However, the determination of the main rivals within NATO to involve the former enemies in their struggle for power and dominance within the Alliance is already giving hints to whom the bill will be delivered. Therefore it is wrong to expect that such a process will have a positive impact on European security. It is more probable that Europe will be thrown back to the time when it was the arena in which world wars were triggered. Is not the NATO ultimatum to the Serbian republic a good enough argument for that?

Milosevic, Greek Communist Delegation Meet

LD2203155194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1527 GMT 22 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, March 22 (TANJUG)—President of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic and Honorary President of the Communist Party of Greece Charilaos Florakis said here on Tuesday they believed that the Balkan nations, in accordance with their vital interests and interdependence, should strive towards development of mutual relations and constructive cooperation on an equal footing.

The two sides agreed this would be the best way to ensure prosperity of the Balkan peoples and guarantee them that their rights and interests would be implemented in peace and in conditions of goodneighbourliness and mutual respect, said a statement released by the Serbian president's office.

Stressing the importance of friendship and close ties between the Serb and Greek peoples, Milosevic said that "for Serbia and its citizens, the support and solidarity of Greece mean moral support and encouragement to put up with the pressure to which they are exposed."

A Greek parliamentary delegation headed by Florakis said on Tuesday in a meeting with Yugoslav Parliamentarian Borisav Jovic that a settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia should be sought only in talks between the warring sides without any external interference, and warned of the danger of the conflict spreading to the entire Balkan region.

The Greek delegation also said that the Greek people had nothing but praise for the Serb people's resistance to attempts by imperialist powers, such as the United States and Germany, to establish a new world order in the Balkans and zones of their economic and political influence in the region.

Jovic, who is chairman of the parliamentary foreign policy committee, said Yugoslavia was vitally interested in an end to all fighting, lifting of unjust sanctions and return to the international community.

In late May 1992, the U.N. Security Council imposed tough sanctions on Yugoslavia for its alleged involvement in civil war in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina although no Yugoslav soldier has been fighting there.

Jovic also hailed Greece's support and aid it had been wholeheartedly rendering to the Serb people in this difficult stage in its history.

Party Official Expects Protests To Erupt

BR2103143094 Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS in French 19-20 Mar 94 p 13

[Interview with Miljenko Dereta, vice chairman of the Serbian Civic Alliance movement, by Christophe Urbanowicz; date and place not given: "Spring Will Be Hot in Serbia"]

[Text] *"During the winter it was [Serbian President] Milosevic who was stealing the show, this spring it will be us." So thinks Miljenko Dereta, producer and vice chairman of the Serbian Civic Alliance, an intellectual movement opposed to Milosevic's nationalist regime. In*

an interview with LE QUOTIDIEN, he explains the strengths and weaknesses of Serbia's democratic opposition.

[Urbanowicz] Today, Milosevic's power seems stronger than ever in Serbia. Do you share this opinion?

[Dereta] Milosevic's regime is in crisis, but very little of this crisis is visible. His Socialist Party won the elections, which he organized at an opportune moment during the winter, a traditionally festive period in Serbia. Milosevic stole the show in the winter, but in spring it will be us. And spring risks being hot because of the protest movements which will certainly manifest themselves.

Serbia's economy has been totally destroyed by the UN embargo. We were lucky this winter. The weather was very mild, which is why people, pensioners in particular, did not start to die of hunger. But on the social level, things are beginning to move. Recently high school students protested for the first time, during five days, their hostility to those in power. Civil society is gradually waking up. I believe that change is inevitable, it is merely a question of time.

[Urbanowicz] What are the strengths and weaknesses of the democratic opposition?

[Dereta] We have more weaknesses than strengths, obviously. We have neither Solidarity or Havel with which to confront the Milosevic regime. Apart from the absence of a dynamic and uncontested leader, one of our greatest weaknesses is the lack of unity. We could have had 14 more seats, with the same number of votes which we gained at the December elections, but the opposition was unable to present a common front, for reasons of personal ambitions of some of its leaders.

In theory, the democratic opposition constitutes the main force in Parliament. In the Assembly, this democratic opposition represents a total of 127 deputies, as against 123 seats taken by Milosevic's Socialist Party (the DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] coalition: 45; the Democratic Party (DS): 29; the Serbian Democratic Party (DSS): 7; the Hungarian Party (DZVM): 5; and the Albanian Party (DPA): 2).

But this advantage is of little use because, in practice, the opposition is incapable of presenting a common front, for personal reasons. Example: A Milosevic man was elected in January as speaker of the Assembly with four opposition votes! Milosevic's phrase: "I have only 123 deputies, but the opposition will never have 127," clearly sums up the play of forces.

Another weakness: the media. It is very difficult for us to gain access to the official media, in particular television, which is almost entirely controlled by his men. The way Milosevic's regime stupefies people with manipulated information is a crime. Throughout the election campaign, Serbian Democratic Alliance President Vesna Pesic was unable to appear on the screen except at the legally obligatory presentation of all the parties. To our great dismay, the phantom Communist Union—led by the Serbian president's wife, Mira Milosevic—took up more TV time than the other democratic opposition parties. And this Communist Union exists only in the state administration and in the army, not on the political scene!

Our strength lies in young people, who are increasingly turning toward opposition movements. Our strength lies also in the experience which we are acquiring, for the time being at our own expense. Let us not forget that democracy in Serbia is just four years old.

[Urbanowicz] What do you intend to do to convince the Serbian hinterland, whose votes enabled Milosevic's Socialist party to remain in power?

[Dereta] We were shocked by the results of the elections in the Serbian hinterland. We did not imagine that the past weighed so heavily and that the fear of change was so strong. We underestimated the provinces; it was what happened outside Belgrade which clinched the election. Whereas Serbian city dwellers remain relatively well-informed with their four TV channels and numerous radio stations, rural Serbia is unaware of what is going on in the outside world. That Serbia does not read the newspapers. Sociologists are well aware that one Serbian in two is illiterate. There are more illiterate people in Serbia than in its Kosovo province, which has an Albanian majority. Our program is not well understood by this rural Serbia.

[Urbanowicz] You took part in the last issue of TEMPS MODERNES [title as published], devoted to "Another Serbia." What, for you, is this other Serbia?

[Dereta] Our electoral slogan was: "To live like normal people." Living normally, that is our objective, that means in a state governed by the force of law, in a market economy, and with respect for our neighbors, whatever their origin. None of these concepts are well understood in our country. The absurdity of our situation is that we are fighting for the arrival of normality and against being forgotten in the West, where we are almost completely ignored.

Draskovic Compares Washington Accord to Yalta

AU2203205994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] The Washington agreement between the Croats and the Muslims in many ways resembles the Yalta [agreement]. It harbingers the division of the former Yugoslavia into western and eastern spheres of influence, but also opens another possibility, Vuk Draskovic said at the news conference of the Serbian Renewal Movement. Radovan Pantovic has the details.

[Begin recording] [Pantovic] Neither the West or Russia are in favor of a Yalta-like division. It is for Belgrade to decide whether it shall be Yalta or an establishment of a certain union, that is, a reintegration on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Vuk Draskovic says. If the first option is decided on, the Serbs in Bosnia will get

international recognition, but will have to concede one-third of territories and will probably not be able to join Yugoslavia except in a confederal form. As an alternative to this arrangement, interpreting the Washington agreement Draskovic mentioned the possibility for the Serbs to join a federal or a similar union [savez] with the Muslims and the Croats. This would enable Serbian cantons to join a confederation with Serbia and Montenegro. If they join a federal arrangement with Croats and Muslims, considerably smaller territorial concessions would be demanded of the Serbs. The Serbian cantons would be equal users of all international funds for renewal and development of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia could also reckon with the economic aid that had been promised to Croatia for signing the peace, something that would mean the lifting of sanctions. In conformity with this, the Serbian Krajina would establish three-fold connections, and would do so as a state: with Croatia, the Serbian cantons in Bosnia, and Yugoslavia.

According to Draskovic's interpretation of the Washington document, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] would also join a confederation with Yugoslavia in this case. Therefore....

[Draskovic] The Serbian Renewal Movement is against Yalta. From the very beginning, as regards Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian Renewal Movement is in favor of a cantonal setup. The Serbian Renewal Movement favors this second solution.

[Pantovic] The Serbian Renewal Movement demands a firm international guarantee that the return of refugees to their homes would be secured. Draskovic condemned, as he put it, Belgrade's silence, because in his opinion, the fate of Serbs and the Serbian people must not be decided upon by the Pale top military political leadership alone. [end recording]

Urges Cantons as Alternative

LD2203184494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1816 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 22 (TANJUG)—Vuk Draskovic, leader of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), said on Tuesday that the (Moslem-Croat) Washington agreement clearly indicated a possibility that former Yugoslavia be divided into two spheres of influence—the Western and the Russian.

Speaking at a press conference in Belgrade, Draskovic compared o the agreement signed in Washington on March 18 on setting up a Moslem-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its subsequent confederation with Croatia with the Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill verbal accord reached in Yalta fifty years ago.

Draskovic, whose party is among the strongest opposition parties in both the federal and republican parliaments said he was against any kind of Yalta agreements and in favour of economic, cultural and some form of political reintegration of war-shattered former Yugoslavia.

He said that Bosnian Serbs had the alternative to form some kind of federal ties with the Moslems and Croats, which would make Bosnia-Herzegovina a federation or an assymetrical federation of Serb, Croat and Moslem cantons.

After Bosnian Moslems and Croats in early 1992 voted for Bosnia's secession from the former Yugoslav federation, Bosnian Serbs proclaimed their own republic in their ancestral lands in Bosnia- Herzegovina.

Draskovic said the Serb cantons could enter into a confederation with Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) or join a Bosnian federation, in which case they would not have to cede so much of their territories.

In the latter case, Yugoslavia could expect the lifting of international sanctions and the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) would establish trilateral ties with Croatia, the Serb cantons in Bosnia and with Yugoslavia. Moreover, he added, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would then almost certainly form confederal ties with Yugoslavia.

The RSK was proclaimed in 1991 in predominantly Serb-populated territories in Croatia in response to Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslav Federation. It was placed under U.N. control in March 1992.